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INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, in Lawrence v. Texas, 
that state laws criminalizing gay sex were unconstitutional.1  The 
decision is ground-breaking because, for the first time in U.S. history, 
the highest court in the land determined that gays could not be fined 
or imprisoned for private, adult consensual sex, something the Court 
only seventeen years earlier did not consider a fundamental right.2  
The ruling is also controversial because Americans seem to be deeply 
divided when it comes to issues regarding gay rights.  While studies 
indicate that most Americans support the adoption of laws that grant 
gays the most basic of civil rights, like the right to the kind of privacy 
in the bedroom that Lawrence envisioned, many also believe that 
homosexuality is immoral.3 
With respect to the issue of whether or not gays should be able to 
marry, a 2005 nationwide poll conducted for the Boston Globe 
indicated that forty-six percent of the respondents said they were 
against gay marriage and thirty-seven percent said that they supported 
it.4  Forty-six percent of those that the Globe surveyed, however, also 
indicated that they supported civil unions between gays in which gays 
could enjoy “some, but not all, of the legal rights of married couples 
while forty-one percent said that they were opposed” to such unions.5  
This split in American perspectives is tied to age, with Americans 
thirty-five years old and younger decidedly more pro-gay in their 
attitudes than their plus sixty-five year old counterparts.6  It is 
                                                          
      * Professor of Law, Babson College.  B.S., J.D., Georgetown University; Ph.D., 
Northeastern University.  Visiting Scholar, University of Westminster School of Law, 
London (in association with the AHRC Research Centre for Law, Gender and 
Sexuality at Kent University, Canterbury).  I would like to thank Lee Badgett, Annie 
Ellman, and Kim Westheimer for giving me feedback on earlier drafts of this article, 
and the Babson Board of Research for its continuing support. 
 1. See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that gay individuals have the right to 
engage in private and consensual sexual conduct free from government 
intervention). 
 2. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (concluding that there is 
no fundamental right to engage in “homosexual sodomy”). 
 3. See Jennifer Loftus, American Liberalization in Attitudes Toward 
Homosexuality: 1973-1998, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 762, 778 (2001) (suggesting that the 
question of the morality of homosexuality turns not on the minority status of gays and 
lesbians but rather on gay sexuality, thus implicating Americans’ adverse and 
puritanical ideas about sexual behavior). 
 4. See Scott S. Greenberger, One Year Later, Nation Divided on Gay Marriage, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2005, at A1 (describing how public attitudes towards gay 
marriage vary according to region and age). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. (reporting that only thirty-nine percent of respondents between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-four disapprove of gay marriage, as compared to sixty-
four percent of respondents over the age of sixty-five that do not support gay 
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therefore possible that many of these issues will become moot, as 
younger American voters and policy makers replace their older 
counterparts over the next few decades.  The inevitability of this 
dynamic is reflected in the Globe study results, which revealed that 
“[w]hatever their views on gay marriage, most respondents predicted 
that some or all states would end up legalizing it.”7 
Shortly after deciding Lawrence, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
ruled, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, that 
Massachusetts state law prohibiting gay marriage was unconstitutional 
under Massachusetts law.8  Noting that marriage is “an esteemed 
institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among 
life’s momentous acts of self-definition,”9 the court concluded that 
state law preventing gays from marrying “is incompatible with the 
[state’s] constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy 
and equality under law.”10  “This is a momentous legal and cultural 
milestone,”11 said the plaintiff’s lawyer, Mary L. Bonauto of the Gay 
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (“GLAD”), the public interest 
law group that represented the plaintiffs in the case.  “The law caught 
up with the reality that gay people and their families are part of the 
fabric of our communities.  At long last, gay and lesbian families and 
their children will finally be equal families in the Commonwealth.  
This will make a huge difference in people’s lives.”12 
Soon after the Goodridge ruling, New Jersey passed a same sex 
domestic partnership law in 2004,13 and Connecticut passed a law in 
2005 favoring same sex civil unions.14  Several other states now have 
domestic partnership laws that give limited rights to gay couples.15 
                                                          
marriage). 
 7. See id. (stating that ninety-one percent of those who support gay marriage 
believe that the impetus to allow homosexuals to marry will spread to other states, 
while sixty-three percent of opponents agree that this impetus will spread). 
 8. 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (2003) (relying on Lawrence to support the conclusion 
that denying civil marriage violates basic principles of equality and autonomy). 
 9. Id. at 322. 
 10. Id. at 313. 
 11. Glad.org, Gay and Lesbian Families Win Marriage Case Before Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, Nov. 18, 2004, http://www.glad.org/News_Room/press63-
11-18-03.shtml. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2 (West 2004) (stating that all persons in domestic 
partnerships, regardless of their sex, should have access to the same rights and 
benefits under New Jersey law). 
 14. See S. 963, 2005 Leg. §§ 1-3 (Ct. 2005) (stating that persons of the same sex 
are eligible to enter into a civil union). 
 15. See HRC.org, Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, http://hrc.org/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=20716&TEMPLATE=/TaggedPage/Ta
ggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=66 (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State] (listing state provisions regarding 
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A large number of people who label themselves as religious and 
politically conservative are not happy with the above developments.16  
For these individuals, gay marriage represents the ever increasing 
demise of traditional family and religious values.17  Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia sympathizes with this view in his dissenting 
opinion in Lawrence.18  He said that 
[m]any Americans do not want persons who openly engage in 
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters 
for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as 
boarders in their home.  They view this as protecting themselves 
and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral 
and destructive.19 
Justice Scalia also warned that the decision could ultimately lead to 
the Supreme Court’s endorsement of gay marriage nationwide, and 
he observed that “[t]oday’s opinion dismantles the structure of 
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between 
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in 
marriage is concerned.”20 
Embracing Scalia’s warning, conservative activists and politicians 
continue their efforts to pass laws that enable states opposed to gay 
marriage to refuse to recognize those marriages when they are 
officiated in other states, and to prevent gays from marrying within 
their own borders.21  There are forty states that have passed such laws, 
by adopting statutory (usually referred to as of Defense of Marriage 
Acts or “DOMAs”) or constitutional provisions to this effect.22  As of 
this writing, eighteen states passed constitutional amendments 
banning same sex marriage, and several others hope to have similar 
provisions under consideration in the upcoming election year.23  A 
                                                          
relationship recognition for same sex couples). 
 16. See Greenberger, supra note 4, at A1 (discussing the Boston Globe’s survey 
results, which showed that “Americans older than [sixty-five], Republicans, 
Protestants, regular churchgoers, and Southerners” tend to oppose gay marriage). 
 17. See id. at A1 (quoting a survey participant stating that gay marriage confuses 
children and “lowers our moral values because it’s against the Bible”). 
 18. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(comparing homosexuality to other illegal and immoral practices such as bigamy, 
incest and prostitution). 
 19. Id. at 602. 
 20. Id. at 604. 
 21. See Steve LeBlanc, One Year on, Massachusetts’ Gay Marriage Ruling Fuels 
Passions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 14, 2005 (explaining that many states do not want to 
permit same sex marriage). 
 22. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (describing 
various state bans on the recognition of marriages between same sex couples). 
 23. See LeBlanc, supra note 21 (summarizing that, while in the past year only one 
state, Connecticut, enacted a law legalizing same sex civil unions, Alabama, South 
Dakota, and Tennessee are to enact bans on same sex unions next year and almost a 
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federal DOMA was passed in 1996, and bills calling for a U.S. 
constitutional amendment banning same sex marriage were 
introduced in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in 2003 
and again in 2005.24 
Despite the legislative backlash against gay marriage and Justice 
Scalia’s misgivings about the Lawrence decision, the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in Lawrence and in earlier cases concerning due process and 
equal protection under the law make it clear that the right to same 
sex marriage is clearly protected by the U.S. Constitution.  Whether or 
not the Court will adhere to this view, however, is directly related to 
two momentous changes that took place on the Court in 2005 and 
early 2006.  First, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
announced in the Summer of 2005 that she would be retiring from 
the bench after twenty-four years of service.25  Second, before the U.S. 
Senate approved Justice O’Connor’s replacement, Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist succumbed to a protracted battle with thyroid 
cancer, ending a thirty-three year term on the Court.26  The Senate 
voted to replace Rehnquist with Bush nominee and federal appeals 
court judge John Roberts in the fall of 2005.  It then approved Bush 
nominee and federal appeals court judge Samuel Alito to replace 
Justice O’Connor in January of 2006.27 
Chief Justice Rehnquist was no friend to gay rights advocates.  He 
voted on countless occasions to ignore the rights of gays to enjoy 
equal protection under the law.28  Justice O’Connor’s stance on gay 
rights issues is a bit more complex.  Although she concurred with the 
majority opinion’s decision to strike down state anti-sodomy laws in 
Lawrence, a close reading of her reasoning in Lawrence leads me to 
believe that it is not clear that she would have endorsed a pro-gay 
                                                          
dozen other states are considering following suit). 
 24. See HRC.org, Marriage Protection Amendment, http://www.hrc.org/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Federal_Constitutional_Marriage_Amendment (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Marriage Protection Amendment] (discussing the failure 
of the proposed federal marriage amendment in both the House and the Senate). 
 25. See Evan Thomas & Stuart Taylor Jr., Queen of the Center, NEWSWEEK, July 
11, 2005, at 24-25 (assessing Justice O’Connor’s legacy on the Supreme Court and 
examining the importance of her influence as the ‘swing vote’ in many close 
decisions). 
 26. See Charles Lane, Chief Justice Dies at Age 80, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at 
A1 (noting that the Senate was preparing for hearings on John Roberts, who, at the 
time of the Chief Justice’s death, was President Bush’s nominee to replace Sandra Day 
O’Connor as an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 27. Charles Babington, Alito Is Sworn in on High Court; Senators Confirm 
Conservative Judge Largely on Party Lines, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1. 
 28. See infra notes 312-319 and accompanying text (discussing former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s conservative leanings on such issues as affirmative action, 
abortion, and anti-sodomy laws). 
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marriage decision had she decided to stay on the Court.29  Will 
Rehnquist and O’Connor’s replacements follow in their footsteps?  
While Justice Roberts’ and Justice Alito’s views on gay marriage have 
been the subject of much speculation,30 it is my hope that the new 
justices will, along with their other colleagues on the Court, keep an 
open mind and follow the lead of Canada and the European 
Community, where attitudes about gay life and gay marriage are much 
more inclusive and open-minded, and where sweeping legislative and 
judicial reforms favoring gay rights have been underway for the past 
several years.31  Gay marriage is legal in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
seven of the ten Canadian provinces, and most recently in Spain.32  In 
addition, same sex civil unions have recently become legal in the 
United Kingdom.33  Dismantling laws and policies in the U.S. that 
hinder movement in a similar direction is long overdue. 
Part I of this Article will explore why gay marriage has become such 
a contentious issue in the United States, by first examining why some 
people in the gay rights movement believe that full equality cannot be 
achieved unless gay couples have the right to marry.34  Part I will also 
explore debates taking place within the gay community itself about 
the merits of making marriage the prime focus of political activism, 
when it could be argued that there are other, more pressing social 
justice issues that deserve attention, like the fight for economic 
equality for all people, regardless of their marital status.  Finally, Part I 
will look at the views of conservative activists and politicians who hope 
to successfully pass DOMAs in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia, as well as a federal constitutional amendment banning gay 
marriage. 
Part II will cover the three court cases upon which the current 
                                                          
 29. See infra notes 320-326 and accompanying text (asserting that Justice 
O’Connor has not taken a consistent position on gay rights and adding that it is 
impossible to predict how she would rule in a gay marriage case). 
 30. See infra notes 327-332 and accompanying text (theorizing that while Chief 
Justice John Roberts may have a more open attitude towards gay rights than former 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Roberts’ opposition to decisions such as Roe v. Wade could 
undermine fundamental rights important to the gay and lesbian community). 
 31. See Michael Foust, On Views on Homosexuality, U.S. Differs From Canada, 
Britain, BAPTIST PRESS, May 27, 2005, http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=20871 
(citing a poll showing that the majority of citizens in Canada and Great Britain say 
that homosexuality is “morally acceptable” and favor gay marriage while a majority of 
Americans believe that homosexuality is “morally wrong” and oppose gay marriage). 
 32. See id. (stating that the governing party in Canada is pushing a bill that would 
legalize same sex marriages across the country). 
 33. See id. (explaining that Great Britain’s law granting gay and lesbian couples 
all the benefits of marriage take effect in late 2005). 
 34. See infra Part I.A (including a discussion of historical and contemporary 
definitions of marriage and an examination of why some heterosexual and gay people 
choose to marry). 
6
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss2/2
2006] ADAM AND STEVE VS. ADAM AND EVE 259 
Supreme Court will most probably rely when it next considers a gay 
marriage claim.  Those cases are the 1967 decision, Loving v. 
Virginia,35 in which the Court struck down laws criminalizing 
interracial marriage, the 1996 case, Romer v. Evans,36 where the 
Court ruled that states could not enact laws that attempt to 
permanently exclude gays from being able to participate in the 
political process, and the Lawrence case mentioned above.37  In each 
of these decisions, the justices relied on the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution to support their rulings.38 
Part III will examine how courts have interpreted the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Constitution,39 which, along with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is the other part of the Constitution most relevant to the 
gay marriage debate.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires each 
state to honor the public acts and records of other states.40  Gay rights 
advocates believe that gay couples who marry in places like 
Massachusetts should be able to get full recognition for their 
marriages if they end up moving to other states, even if those states 
have passed DOMAs.41  Those who support DOMAs think the 
contrary, and hope that courts will apply jurisprudence that allows 
states to ignore the public acts of other states in certain limited 
instances.42 
The last section will consist of my conclusions.  I will look at the 
legacies of Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor with respect to gay 
                                                          
 35. 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that a Virginia law prohibiting interracial 
couples from marrying was unconstitutional because it denied individuals the 
fundamental right to marry and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 36. 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional amendment 
that prohibited any pro-gay anti-discrimination legislation). 
 37. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that personal decisions 
made about sexual relationships are a liberty interest protected under the Due 
Process Clause). 
 38. See infra Part II.B-C (explaining how the Supreme Court’s application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in cases not related to race has laid the ground for 
constitutional challenges to anti-gay legislation). 
 39. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (stating that each state must give ‘full faith and 
credit’ to the laws of other states). 
 40. See id. (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings 
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”) 
 41. See, e.g., Steve Sanders, Op-Ed., Full Faith for Judgments, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 21, 
2005, at A27  (arguing that a state’s refusal to recognize same sex marriages from 
another state will have the consequence of arbitrarily depriving gays and lesbians of 
property merely on account of their sexuality). 
 42. See id. (describing how the federal DOMA permits states to refuse to honor 
other state statues and judgments regarding same sex marriage that are contrary to 
their  policies). 
7
Lester: Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
260 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 14:2 
rights issues, discuss how Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel 
Alito might rule on these topics, and also predict that, barring the 
virtually impossible chance that legislators will amend the U.S. 
Constitution, there is a strong chance that the new Supreme Court 
will rule that gay marriage is worthy of constitutional protection.43 
I.  Gay Marriage and the Current Political Climate 
A.  What Is Marriage? 
1.  Civil v. Religious Marriage 
Before launching into a discussion of gay marriage and the current 
political climate surrounding it, the terms “marriage,” “gay marriage,” 
“civil unions,” and “domestic partnerships” should be defined.  The 
2005 online version of the American Heritage College Dictionary 
defines marriage as “[t]he legal union of a man and woman as 
husband and wife . . . .  A union between two persons having the 
customary but usually not the legal force of marriage: a same sex 
marriage . . . .  A close union.”44  A 1993 hard copy edition of the 
same dictionary only refers to opposite sex couples, and sidesteps the 
question of same sex marriage altogether.45  It defines marriage as 
“the legal union of a man and a woman as husband and wife.”46  
While the newer, more inclusive definition of marriage is devoid of 
the kind of politically polarizing commentary that can be found in the 
press and on most talk radio today, it reflects a monumental cultural 
shift in both language use and attitudes over the last two decades.  Gay 
marriage, at least according to this leading chronicler of cultural 
phenomenon, now stands right next to heterosexual marriage as an 
alternative form of matrimony.  Those religious and political 
conservatives who are opposed to gay marriage would probably beg to 
differ. 
Indeed, it is important to note that neither of the above two 
definitions refers to the kind of marriage or union that would be 
performed as part of a religious ceremony.  Both refer to legal unions 
with the implication being that marriage is grounded in civil, not 
natural law.  Support for this perspective can be found in the 
                                                          
 43. See infra Conclusion. 
 44. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000), 
available at http://education.yahoo.com/ reference/dictionary/entry/marriage. 
 45. See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 832 (3d ed. 1993) (omitting 
same sex marriage from the definition of marriage but including a definition of 
marriage as “a close union”). 
 46. Id. 
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Goodridge v. Department of Public Health decision rendered in 
Massachusetts two years ago: 
Simply put, the government creates civil marriage.  In 
Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since pre-Colonial days has 
been, precisely what its name implies: a wholly secular institution.  
No religious ceremony has ever been required to validate a 
Massachusetts marriage.  In a real sense, there are three partners to 
every civil marriage: two willing spouses and an approving State.47 
The view that the rules for marriage should be based solely on civil 
law, however, is the subject of much legal, political, and social debate.  
For many Americans, for instance, the views of the Vatican have much 
greater currency than the views of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.  
In a set of guidelines issued the same year that the Goodridge case was 
decided, the Vatican said that “[m]arriage exists solely between a man 
and woman . . . .  Marriage is holy, while homosexual acts go against 
the natural moral law.”48  The Vatican also urged Roman Catholic 
legislators “to vote against bills legalizing gay marriage, and where 
they already exist, work towards repealing them.”49 
2.  The Legal and Financial Benefits of Marriage 
There are numerous benefits that married couples, as opposed to 
non-married people, enjoy.  For instance, in Massachusetts, which is 
currently the only state in the country that allows gays to marry,50 
each member of a married couple enjoys such benefits as the 
following: ability to file jointly on their state tax returns; participate in 
a tenancy by the entirety, in which the surviving spouse automatically 
inherits the deceased spouse’s property unless the deceased spouse 
had a will that said otherwise; and take advantage of the homestead 
protection, in which the couple’s home is protected from creditors in 
the event that one spouse dies.51 
                                                          
 47. See 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Munson, 127 Mass. 
459, 460-466 (1879)) (noting that “in Massachusetts, from very early times, the 
requisites of a valid marriage have been regulated by statutes of the Colony, Province, 
and Commonwealth,” and surveying marriage statutes from 1639 through 1834). 
 48. Vatican Fights Gay Marriage, CNN.COM, July 31, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2003/WORLD/Europe/07/31/Vatican.gay.marriages/index.html. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (noting that 
Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same sex couples on May 17, 2004). 
 51. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955-57 (indicating that other benefits accruing 
to married couples include the following: the ability to acquire wages owed to a 
deceased spouse by the deceased spouse’s employer, continue operating the 
businesses of a deceased spouse; participate in the medical plan of a spouse who is a 
state employee; receive monetary compensation for the loss of a spouse who worked 
as a fire fighter or police officer killed in the line of duty; have an equitable division 
of marital property pursuant to a divorce; sue for a spouse’s wrongful death or loss of 
consortium in a tort action; receive compensation for funeral expenses and punitive 
9
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Although the demarcation between domestic partnerships and civil 
unions is sometimes unclear, domestic partnerships tend to fall into 
two categories: 1) same sex couples whose relationship is 
acknowledged by the state or municipality in which they live, or 2) 
same sex couples who assert that they are in a committed relationship 
in order to get the same work-related benefits that are available to 
heterosexual married employees or to apply for the equivalent of 
common law marital rights in certain kinds of legal disputes.52  With 
respect to the former, gay couples have to register with the state or 
municipality in which they live.53  Registration usually does not give 
couples additional rights or benefits, but it does amount to a public 
recognition of their relationship.54  With respect to the latter, the 
assertion can take the form of an affidavit or other writing in which 
the couple in question state that they share living expenses and intend 
to be in a committed, long term relationship.55 
Furthermore, substantive proof supporting the aforementioned 
assertions should also be supplied in legal disputes.  For instance, in 
the 1989 New York case, Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.,56 the court 
determined that the plaintiff was entitled to stay in the apartment of 
his deceased same sex partner because the governing New York Rent 
and Eviction Regulation allows members of a tenant’s “family” to do 
so.57  The court came to this conclusion after reviewing evidence that 
the couple had a been in a long term committed relationship in 
which they shared a household budget, a joint checking account and 
                                                          
damages arising from tort actions; know that any children born to the couple will be 
entitled to a presumption of legitimacy and parentage under state law; and make 
health care decisions on behalf of the other spouse in the event that that spouse 
becomes physically or mentally incapacitated). 
 52. See David L. Chambers, Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic 
Partnership, in JOHN D. D’EMILIO ET AL., CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 281, 299 (2000) (observing that while public registration for same 
sex couples is merely symbolic, and at its purest form does not convey any benefits 
onto couples, public and private employers can independently choose to provide the 
same benefits for married couples and domestic partners). 
 53. See id. at 299 (relating that in 1982, San Francisco became the first city to 
permit unmarried same sex couples to register as domestic partners). 
 54. See id. (suggesting that public registration conveys the message that same sex 
or unmarried-couple relationships are as worthy of public recognition as are 
traditional marriage partnerships). 
 55. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN., § 26:8A-2 (West 2004) (stating that, in order to 
establish a domestic partnership, two non-related persons must demonstrate that they 
have entered into a relationship of mutual caring and are jointly responsible for each 
other’s common welfare). 
 56. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
 57. See id. at 55 (concluding that, when the legislature used the term “family” in 
a rent regulation, it intended to protect all tenants residing in households with the 
characteristics of a normal family). 
10
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss2/2
2006] ADAM AND STEVE VS. ADAM AND EVE 263 
three safe deposit boxes, among other things.58 
As of this writing, California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, 
Maine and New Jersey all have some form of domestic partnership 
laws.59  New Jersey’s 2004 domestic partnership law allows the state’s 
gay couples to file jointly on their state tax returns and have hospital 
visitation rights, and the law requires insurance companies to make 
domestic partner benefits available to state government workers.60  
Some municipalities, like San Francisco, also provide some 
combination of registration and domestic partner benefits to gay 
government workers.61 
Vermont (in 2000) and Connecticut (in 2005) are the only two 
states to allow civil unions.62  Civil unions are state sanctioned 
relationships that usually grant all the benefits of marriage, without 
calling it marriage.63  For instance, the new Connecticut law gives 
same sex couples “all the same benefits, protections and 
responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to spouses in a marriage,” 
64 but defines marriage as “applying only to one man and one 
woman.” 65 
                                                          
 58. See id. (applying an objective test and concluding that the same sex partner 
of a deceased tenant fell under a regulation’s definition of family member and 
therefore was entitled to protection from eviction). 
 59. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (explaining 
that these states allow limited rights to same sex couples but do not necessarily 
provide the same federal protections extended to heterosexual married couples). 
 60. See § 26:8A-2 (describing the receipt of these rights and benefits as integral to 
the success and enjoyment of a domestic partnership); HRC.org, New Jersey 
Marriage/Relationship Recognition Law, http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm? 
Section=Federal_Marriage_Amendment1&CONTENTID=21663&TEMPLATE=/Cont
entManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter New 
Jersey Marriage/Relationship Recognition Law] (explaining that New Jersey requires 
insurance companies to provide coverage for a domestic partner, and while domestic 
partners of state employees are entitled to insurance benefits, private employers can 
decide whether or not to offer benefits to employees’ same sex partners). 
 61. See Chambers, supra note 52, at 301 (remarking that San Francisco provides 
greater registration and partner benefits than most other cities, requiring employers 
who contract with the city to provide benefits to their employees’ partners). 
 62. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 et seq. (West 2003) (indicating that any two 
eligible persons may establish a civil union while marriage is reserved for eligible 
heterosexual couples); S. 963, 2005 Leg. (Ct. 2005) (stating that two persons entering 
into a civil union may be of the same sex); see also Paul Carrier, House Soundly 
Rejects Amendment, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 8, 2005, at A1 (relating that 
Maine’s House of Representatives rejected a proposed amendment to the state 
constitution that would prohibit same sex marriages and civil unions). 
 63. Brad Knickerbocker, Tug of War Intensifies on Gay-Marriage Issue, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, May 5, 2005, at 2 (noting that many elected officials, conscious of a 
growing “pro-marriage” movement, are careful to define marriage as limited to a man 
and a woman when enacting statutes approving civil unions between same sex couples 
in an effort to distinguish the two). 
 64. S. 963 § 14. 
 65. Id. 
11
Lester: Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
264 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 14:2 
It is important to note that no gay couple married in Massachusetts 
or in a civil union or a domestic partnership authorized in the above 
listed states is able to enjoy certain federal protections that are 
available to all American married heterosexual couples.66  Such 
protections include the right to take advantage of federal family leave 
laws when one partner is ill, the right to receive the federal social 
security benefits of a deceased partner, and the right to take 
advantage of federal income tax benefits for married couples filing 
jointly on their tax returns.67  With respect to the latter, “federal tax 
laws require unmarried employees to report as taxable income the 
value of health coverage provided to their partners but permit 
married employees to exclude it.”68 
B.  Debates in the Gay Community About the Pros and Cons of Gay 
Marriage 
It is possible for unmarried gay couples to secure some of the 
concrete marital benefits discussed in the Goodridge decision, like 
hospital visitation and inheritance rights, as well as the equitable 
distribution of post-divorce property, without getting married.  They 
would need to hire an attorney to do so, however, and this can be a 
financially costly process.69  It is therefore easy to understand why 
many gay couples would opt to marry when given the chance,70 and 
                                                          
 66. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (noting that 
under Vermont law, couples in civil unions have the same rights and responsibilities 
as married couples on the State level, but have no such rights on the Federal level). 
 67. See HRC.org, Top [Ten] Reasons for Marriage Equality, http://www.hrc.org/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=14392&TEMPLATE=/ContentManage
ment/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Top Ten Reasons 
for Marriage Equality] (commenting that the children of same sex parents are also 
precluded from establishing a legal relationship to both parents under federal law 
and are unable to receive important federal protections, such as Social Security 
survivor benefits). 
 68. See Chambers, supra note 52, at 302 (exploring the fact that benefits for same 
sex couples under the federal tax statutes may not be as extensive as commentators 
think and adding that few gay or lesbian employees avail themselves of partner 
benefits when they are offered by employers); see also, Kay Lazar, Double Trouble on 
Taxes for Gays Newly Married Facing Two Sets of Filing Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 
30, 2004, at 1 (describing how same sex married couples in Massachusetts, unlike 
heterosexual couples, must file their yearly income tax forms twice: they must file as 
single on their federal tax forms because the federal government does not recognize 
same sex marriage, and they must file as couple on their state tax forms because 
Massachusetts requires married couples to file jointly). 
 69. See Top Ten Reasons for Marriage Equality, supra note 67 (explaining that 
while some rights are available through costly legal proceedings, same sex couples 
have no way to access some benefits accorded to heterosexual couples). 
 70. See Karen Lee Ziner, Same-Sex Marriage: One Year Later—Nothing Less 
Than Love, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., May 15, 2005, at B-01 (relating the story of two 
women and their daughter who were able to become a legally recognized family after 
Massachusetts legalized gay marriage, and they were thus able to obtain basic state 
legal protections for their daughter). 
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see domestic partnerships and civil unions as ‘“separate but equal’ 
half measures on the way to fully legalizing same-sex marriage.”71  But 
perhaps the most important reason that gay couples prefer same sex 
marriage is the symbolic societal recognition that married couples 
enjoy as they embark on what they hope will be a journey of mutual 
emotional and financial interdependence. 
Explaining why he sued the state of Minnesota in 1970 for refusing 
to grant him and his partner a marriage license, gay rights pioneer 
Michael McConnell said, “I sincerely believe that my love for Jack is as 
valid and deep as any heterosexual love, and I think it should be 
recognized—I demand that it be recognized!—by the state and 
society.”72  McConnell and his partner, Jack Baker, were the first 
openly gay couple to bring a lawsuit against their state when the city 
clerk in their Minnesota town rejected their request for a marriage 
license in 1970.73  The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected their 
claims, however, on the grounds that “marriage uniquely involves 
procreation and the rearing of children.”74  In addition to losing the 
suit, McConnell lost a job that the University of Minnesota had 
promised him because of the heightened public attention he received 
as a result of the lawsuit.75  He also lost the lawsuit he brought against 
the university for refusing to hire him.76  The court ruled that 
McConnell had no legally protected right to “foist tacit approval of 
this socially repugnant concept upon his employer.”77 
Similar legal challenges to state marriage laws were made in the 
1970s by several other gay men and lesbians hoping to get their 
                                                          
 71. Knickerbocker, supra note 63. 
 72. Chambers, supra note 52, at 283-284 (citing KAY TOBIN & RANDY WICKER, THE 
GAY CRUSADERS 144 (1975)). 
 73. See id. at 283-285 (recounting how McConnell, a young gay rights activist, 
invited the press to come with him and his partner when they went to apply for a 
marriage license and, as a result, garnered national attention and likely brought the 
concept of legal same sex marriage to the attention of many members of the gay 
community for the first time). 
 74. Id. at 284 (stating that Minnesota’s marriage statute did not permit same sex 
marriages and finding that a prohibition on same sex marriage did not violate 
McConnell’s Due Process or Equal Protection rights); see also Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (holding that limiting marriage to heterosexual 
couples is not irrational or discriminatory because of the deeply founded concept of 
marriage as a union between a man and a woman involving the bearing and rearing 
of children). 
 75. See Chambers, supra note 52, at 286 (stating that McConnell filed a suit to get 
his job as a librarian back but lost in federal court after a judge found that McConnell 
had publicly flaunted his homosexuality and his employer was not required to 
tolerate such behavior). 
 76. See id. (concluding that seeking a marriage license is not constitutionally 
protected behavior). 
 77. Id. (citing McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
405 U.S. 1046 (1972)). 
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respective states to let them marry.78  All of them were unsuccessful.79  
While the 1980s and 1990s produced some temporary successes in 
court, they too ultimately failed.80  For instance, several years after the 
Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that Hawaii’s attempts to 
prevent gays from marrying violated the state constitution’s equal 
protection clause,81 the Hawaii legislature passed a state constitutional 
amendment banning same sex marriage in 1998.82  In that same year, 
the Alaskan state legislature amended its constitution to limit 
marriage to heterosexual couples in response to a judicial ruling that 
such limitations were an illegal form of sex discrimination.83  The 
legal and constitutional issues to which suits like this gave rise will be 
discussed in greater depth in Parts III and IV. 
Despite the setbacks of the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s, the desire on the 
part of certain members of the gay community to marry has not 
diminished.84  If anything, that desire has become even stronger.85  
Witness the fact that over 6000 gay couples registered to marry in 
Massachusetts in the months immediately following the Goodridge 
decision,86 and 3,200 couples applied for marriage licenses in the city 
                                                          
 78. See id. at 288 (discussing similar suits brought by Tracy Knight and Margery 
Jones). 
 79. See id. (noting that courts still cite these early decisions as legal precedent 
and concluding that the only benefit from these early challenges came from news 
articles that depicted gays in a positive manner and increased public awareness of gay 
couples’ demands for recognition). 
 80. See id. (observing that while greater numbers of gays and lesbians were 
demanding state recognition of their relationship, many groups were reluctant to 
pursue legal challenges after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick in 
1986, which many felt was dismissive of gay and lesbian rights). 
 81. See Baehr v. Levin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993) (holding that, while there 
is no fundamental right to same sex marriage under the Hawaii Constitution, 
Hawaii’s marriage laws violate the constitutional right to equal protection by 
discriminating against citizens who wish to marry on the basis of sex). 
 82. See HRC.org, History of Legal Challenges, http://www.hrc.org/Template. 
cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=15328&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter History of Legal 
Challenges] (recounting that in December 1998, after considerable lobbying by 
conservative political groups that opposed gay marriage, Hawaiian citizens voted to 
amend the state constitution to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples). 
 83. See id. (noting that a court decision finding that denial of same sex marriage 
was sex discrimination provided the impetus for gay marriage opponents who placed 
intense political pressure on the legislators to propose the amendment). 
 84. See Gay and Lesbian Families Win Marriage Case Before Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, supra note 11 (stating that granting gay couples the right to 
marry shows that the law is beginning to catch up with the fact that gay people and 
families are becoming a “part of the fabric of our communities”). 
 85. Cf. Greenberger, supra note 4 (suggesting that the gay rights movement is 
gaining support as the older generations, who are more likely to oppose gay 
marriage, pass away). 
 86. See LeBlanc, supra note 21 (positing that Massachusetts could remain the 
only state allowing gay marriage for many years because of the intense debate it 
spurred in the rest of the country). 
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of San Francisco just after the mayor, in an act of social protest, 
announced that he would begin issuing marriage licenses to gay 
couples in contravention of California state law in February of 2004.87  
Commenting on why so many people believe that gay marriage is a 
goal worth fighting for, Thomas Stoddard says: 
Marriage is much more than a relationship sanctioned by law.  It is 
the centerpiece of our entire social structure, the core of the 
traditional notion of “family.”  Even in its present tarnished state, 
the marital relationship inspires sentiments suggesting that it is 
something almost superhuman . . . . 
 . . . Lesbian and gay men are now denied entry to this “noble” 
and “sacred” institution.  The implicit message is. . . [that] [g]ay 
relationships are somehow less significant, less valuable.88 
The Human Rights Campaign (“HRC”), one of the largest gay 
rights advocacy groups in the country, echoes Stoddard’s views.89  In a 
page on their website called “Top 10 Reasons for Marriage Equality,” 
the campaign says: 
Gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people grow up dreaming of 
falling in love, getting married and growing old together.  Just as 
much as the next person, same-sex couples should be able to fulfill 
that dream.  We know from anecdotal evidence that after same-sex 
couples have a commitment ceremony, their friends and family 
treat them differently—as a married couple.  Shouldn’t they, too, 
have the legal security that goes along with that? 90 
While the HRC and other pro-marriage advocacy groups like the 
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (“GLAD”) have been very 
successful making their case in the media and in the courts in recent 
years, other competing voices in the gay community have not been as 
successful.91  For instance, there are many gay rights advocates who 
believe that the push for same sex marriage is a misguided attempt by 
certain members of the gay community to assimilate into mainstream 
                                                          
 87. See Mary Leonard-Ramshaw, Mayor Vows to Continue Same-sex Marriage 
Licenses Assails Bush, Sees ‘Shameful’ Political Bid, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 2004, at 
B7 (recognizing that Mayor Gavin Newsom faced criticism for issuing the marriage 
licenses from those opposed to gay marriage and those who supported it and felt that 
Newsom’s action undermined legal efforts to promote gay marriage). 
 88. Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek The Right To Marry, 
OUT/LOOK 8-12 (1989), reprinted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & NAN D. HUNTER, 
SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 819 (1997). 
 89. See Top Ten Reasons for Marriage Equality, supra note 67 (noting that 
allowing same sex marriage would both move civil rights forward and help to remedy 
the inequities of the past). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Leonard-Ramshaw, supra note 87, at B7 (discussing the backlash 
from the San Francisco mayor’s decision to issue marriage licenses to same sex 
couples without legislative approval, which some gay activists felt bolstered efforts to 
pass anti-gay marriage amendments in other states). 
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heterosexual culture at a time when what is really needed is a 
challenge to that culture.92  People in this camp often come from the 
civil, women’s and gay rights movements of the 1960s and ‘70s, a time 
notorious for the oppressive way in which mainstream America 
resisted the inclusion of African-Americans, women and gays into all 
walks of American life.93  Those who hold this view might point to the 
fact that historically, traditional marriage and the laws that supported 
it were “exceptionally harsh toward women who became wives: a 
woman’s legal identity all but evaporated into that of her husband.”94  
As the court in Goodridge observed, before slavery ended in 
Massachusetts, “the condition of a slave resembled the connection of 
a wife with her husband, and of infant children with their father.  He 
[was] obliged to maintain them, and they [could not] be separated 
from him.”95 
Understandably suspicious of anything that was connected to 
government, patriarchy, racism or capitalism, these activists advocated 
for “sexual liberation and radical social change.”96  As Paula L. 
Ettelbrick says: 
[M]aking legal marriage for lesbian and gay couples a priority 
would set an agenda of gaining rights for a few, but would do 
nothing to correct power imbalances between those who are 
married . . . and those who are not.  Thus, justice would not 
be gained. 
 . . . Those who are more acceptable to the mainstream 
because of race, gender, and economic status are more likely 
to want the right to marry. 
 . . . [W]hat good is the affirmation of our [marital] 
relationships. . . if we are rejected as women, people of color, 
                                                          
 92. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 
OUT/LOOK 8-12 (1989), reprinted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & NAN D. HUNTER, 
SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 817-18 (1997) (arguing that the campaign to legalize 
gay marriage undermines the purpose of the gay rights movements by forcing the 
assimilation of gays into heterosexual society while justice for gay men and lesbians 
can only be achieved by forcing society to accept them despite their differences). 
 93. See CHRIS BULL & JOHN GALLAGHER, PERFECT ENEMIES: THE BATTLE BETWEEN 
THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND THE GAY MOVEMENT 9 (Madison Books 2001) (1996) 
(noting that the early gay rights activists were strongly encouraged by the increased 
awareness produced by the actions of other minorities, and saw an opportunity to 
change class awareness for all disenfranchised groups). 
 94. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003) (citing 
C.P. KINDREGAN, JR., & M.L. INKER, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.9-1.10 (3d ed. 
2002)). 
 95. Id. at 967 (quoting Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123, 129 (1808)). 
 96. See BULL & GALLACHER, supra note 93, at 201 (noting that during the early 
decades the gay rights movement was dominated by a few left-wing activists, but grew 
to include more diverse viewpoints as the movement mirrored AIDS consciousness 
and the conservative atmosphere of the 1980s and 1990s). 
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or working class?97 
Or as Laura Kiritsy puts it, “[t]he unfortunate reality is that many 
GLBT ethnic and racial minorities, like their heterosexual peers, are 
more consumed with finding decent jobs, adequate housing, meeting 
basic healthcare needs and dealing with immigration issues than with 
planning a wedding reception.”98 
For people like Ettelbrick and Kiritsy, radical social change needs to 
involve not simply dispensing marital benefits to yet another small 
and privileged segment of society—same sex couples in long term, 
monogamous relationships—but also recognizing “the relationships 
that citizens view as significant to themselves, relationships that might 
include more than two intimately involved persons and relationships 
that have no sexual component.”99  If this model were followed, for 
example, an eighty year old heterosexual man living with his ninety 
year old heterosexual male friend might be able to get access to the 
equivalent of the friend’s health insurance and social security spousal 
death benefits if the friend had listed him as a designated 
beneficiary.100  Married people would therefore no longer be singled 
out for special treatment, and the economic playing ground for 
people in all kinds of significant relationships who are economically 
needy, as well as single people, would be drastically leveled.101 
I tend to agree that the institution of marriage draws an arbitrary 
circle around people who are deemed more deserving than others of 
certain kinds of rights and privileges that should really be available to 
everyone, not just married people.  Marriage is a package deal, a 
cluster of rights and responsibilities that immediately come into 
existence the moment wedlock occurs.102  It would be far more 
equitable to allow any two or more people who choose to disassemble 
that package and negotiate a contract that distributes these rights and 
                                                          
 97. Ettelbrick, supra note 92, at 817-18. 
 98. Laura Kiritsy, Rainbow Coalition: GLBT Leaders Try to Get People of All 
Races to Talk Amongst Themselves, BAY WINDOWS, July 21, 2005, available at 
http://www.baywindows.com/media/paper328/news/2005/07/21/News/Rainbow.
Coalition-963685.shtml. 
 99. Chambers, supra note 52, at 300. 
 100. See, e.g., New Jersey Marriage/Relationship Recognition Law, supra note 60 
(noting that New Jersey’s domestic partnership law does not require proof of a sexual 
or romantic relationship and both parties must not be related by blood, so two non-
related elderly men of the type just described might be able to become domestic 
partners in New Jersey). 
 101. See Top Ten Reasons for Marriage Equality, supra note 67 (asserting that only 
gay marriage will level the playing field for gays as to married heterosexual couples 
because marriage confers over 1,000 benefits on heterosexual couples). 
 102. See Stoddard, supra note 88, at 819 (surveying both the legal advantages 
granted to married couples as well as those that arise by custom, such as health 
benefits from employers, which often extend to spouses). 
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responsibilities among themselves as they see fit.  Many of the 
package’s individual attributes—increased financial security, 
protection during times of illness, inheritance rights, and even the 
rights and responsibilities of parents with respect to any children that 
might be involved—can easily be accommodated contractually.103  In 
fact, traditionally gay couples have had no other choice, and have 
taken this approach in order to resolve these issues. 
The type of thinking just outlined, however, is probably too radical 
to be popular in today’s market driven America.  It is also not 
sufficiently assimilationist in tone or in content for those moderate 
and liberal heterosexual Americans who might be sympathetic to the 
argument that gay people are just like everybody else to embrace.  
Such individuals, as the HRC website quoted above implies, simply 
wish for the ability to go to work, marry the person they love, and raise 
a family and worship at the church, temple or the mosque of their 
choice.104  The fact that Chief Justice Marshall embraced the 
assimilationist rhetoric in the Goodridge case demonstrates the extent 
to which it has gained currency in a movement that was once, at least 
in part, associated with much more radically progressive politics.105  
Marshall noted that the claimants in Goodridge included: 
business executives, lawyers, an investment banker, educators, 
therapists, and a computer engineer.  Many are active in church, 
community, and school groups . . . .  Each plaintiff attests a desire to 
marry his or her partner in order to affirm publicly their 
commitment to each other and to secure the legal protectionsand 
benefits afforded to married couples and their children.106 
She continues, “Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by 
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones,”107 and by trying 
to prohibit same sex marriage, the state wrongly “confers an official 
stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex 
relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex 
relationships and are not worthy of respect.”108 
                                                          
 103. But see id. (noting the problems with trying to gain these rights through 
contract, including the expense incurred, the need for competent legal counsel, and 
the inherent incompleteness of the rights acquired as compared to those gained 
through marriage). 
 104. See Top Ten Reasons for Marriage Equality, supra note 67 (surveying the 
myriad of advantages to couples who are married as opposed to unmarried couples, 
including over 1,049 benefits given to married heterosexual couples by federal law). 
 105. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) 
(holding that granting same sex marriages supports “the modern family in its many 
variations”). 
 106. Id. at 949. 
 107. Id. at 954. 
 108. Id. at 962. 
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As the above demonstrates, the assimilationist argument appears to 
be the “cost” of equal protection, or at least some abbreviated form of 
equal protection.  As Nancy Polikoff says, “[d]emands for social 
change often have begun with a movement at first articulating the 
rhetoric of radical transformation and then later discarding that 
rhetoric to make the demands more socially acceptable . . . [by 
issuing] reassurances promising that such transformation is not what 
the movement is about at all.”109  So it is with current demands for 
gay marriage.  Even though I am concerned about the privileging 
dimensions of marriage, I still think that gay marriage should be 
legalized, because failure to do so infringes on certain basic individual 
privacy rights and liberties that the Constitution guarantees.110  
Furthermore, perhaps the legal sanctioning of gay marriage will 
contribute to increased tolerance and approval of other kinds of 
people who are society disenfranchised, even when those people are 
not as educated or as well off as the corporate executives, attorneys, 
and bankers hailed in Goodridge.111 
With respect to the gay rights community, as Chris Bull and John 
Gallagher observe in their book on the religious right and the gay 
rights movements, Perfect Enemies, the need for increased respect 
and approval has been steadily building for decades.112  The authors 
note that “[b]y the . . . 1990s . . .  [t]he fierce, long-simmering debate 
among the community’s intellectual leaders over assimilation—
whether gays were just another ethnic group to be absorbed by 
America’s melting pot or a distinct subculture. . . that desires no part 
of the larger, corrupt society—sounded increasingly outdated”113 to 
those gays who simply wanted acceptance from their families and 
their communities.  Gays therefore want to marry, says David 
Chambers, “less, it seems, for the legal benefits that might flow from it 
than for the symbolism of formal equality.  The tenacity of the 
conservatives’ resistance is the measure of [this] need.”114 
                                                          
 109. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and 
Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every 
Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1541 (1993). 
 110. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right to 
marital privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
(interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 111. See 798 N.E.2d at 949 (implying the validity of the plaintiffs’ request for the 
right to marry by referencing their professional jobs). 
 112. See BULL & GALLAGHER, supra note 93 (tracing the evolution of the battle 
between the gay rights movement and the religious right from the 1960s through the 
1990s). 
 113. Id. at 201. 
 114. Chambers, supra note 52, at 303. 
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C.  THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE MOVEMENT 
1.  Conservative Religious and Secular Objections to Gay Marriage. 
As mentioned previously, the 2005 Boston Globe survey indicates 
that most people who are against gay marriage describe themselves as 
religious conservatives.115  The objections to gay marriage that are 
raised by people who self-identify in this manner are very different 
from the kinds of objections to it made by progressive gay rights 
activists.116  For instance, Gary Bauer, president of the religious 
conservative group, American Values, believes that marriage should 
be limited to unions between men and women.117  According to one 
journalist, Bauer refers to gay marriage as “‘the new abortion’ . . . a 
culture-altering change being implemented by judicial fiat.”118  
Furthermore, the Southern Baptist Convention, one of the largest 
conservative Christian denominations in the United States, asserts in 
its official position statement on sexuality: 
We affirm God’s plan for marriage and sexual intimacy—one man, 
and one woman, for life.  Homosexuality is not a “valid alternative 
lifestyle.”  The Bible condemns it as sin.  It is not, however, 
unforgivable sin.  The same redemption available to all sinners is 
available to homosexuals.  They, too, may become new creations in 
Christ.119 
In a 2004 speech, President Bush, himself a self-identified Christian 
conservative, also used religion to justify his opposition to gay 
marriage by stating that “[t]he union of a man and woman is the most 
enduring human institution . . . honored and encouraged in all 
cultures and by every religious faith . . . .  Marriage cannot be severed 
from its cultural, religious and natural roots without weakening the 
                                                          
 115. See Greenberger, supra note 4 (describing those most likely to oppose gay 
marriage as “older than [sixty-five], Republicans, Protestants, regular churchgoers, 
and Southerners”). 
 116. Compare Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage?  It’s 
the Gay Part, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, at 34 (asserting that religious conservatives 
oppose gay marriage because they believe it is against their religion and because they 
believe marriage is limited to a man and a woman in the Bible), with Polikoff, supra 
note 109, at 1536 (stating that she believes that the gay and lesbian rights movement 
should not focus on marriage because “the desire to marry in the lesbian and gay 
community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society”). 
 117. See Shorto, supra note 116, at 34 (noting that Bauer’s views and the views of 
others opposed to gay marriage “are based on their readings of the Bible, their views 
about both homosexuality and . . . marriage and the political force behind the 
issue”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Southern Baptist Convention, http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/pssexuality.asp 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2006). 
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good influence of society.” 120 
Other anti-gay marriage advocates stress the importance of 
heterosexuality to the rearing of children and the protection of 
families.121  As writer Jeff Jacoby argues, “[t]he core of marriage has 
always and everywhere been the pairing of a man and a woman 
because no other arrangement can do what marriage does: produce 
the next generation, bind men to the women who bear their children, 
and give boys and girls the mothers and fathers they need.”122 
What none of the above objections to gay marriage acknowledge, 
however, is that marriage has long since become unmoored from its 
heterosexual, pro-procreative origins, origins which for centuries 
facilitated the subjugation of women to men.123  For instance, in early 
American history, a “woman’s legal identity all but evaporated into 
that of her husband.”124  As the Court in Goodridge observed, “‘the 
condition of a slave resembled the connection of a wife with her 
husband, and of infant children with their father.  He [was] . . . 
obliged to maintain them, and they [could not] . . . be separated from 
him.’”125  Since the earlier times noted in Goodridge, “[m]arriage has 
undergone many changes, from Old Testament times when King 
David had multiple wives and concubines to today’s monogamy, from 
arranged marriages to romance-based marriages, and from banning 
to accepting interracial marriages.”126  Somewhere along the way, 
“love conquered marriage . . . [in order to] make marriage more 
secure by getting rid of the cynicism that accompanied mercenary 
marriage and encouraging couples to place each other first in their 
affections and loyalties.”127  In addition, it is not unusual to find 
young heterosexual couples who use birth control because they have 
                                                          
 120. Same-sex Marriage: Bush’s Remarks on Marriage Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 2005, at A18. 
 121. See Jeff Jacoby, My Best Wishes, TOWNHALL.COM, May 23, 2005, 
http://www.townhall.com/opinions/columns/jeffjacoby/2005/05/23/15499.html 
(stating that even though he opposes gay marriage because it does not conform to 
the traditional goal of marriage, he still understands the emotional impact of the 
same sex marriage issue for the gay movement). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003) 
(indicating that civil marriage has evolved as a public institution through the courts 
and legislature “ameliorat[ing] the harshness of the common-law regime”). 
 124. Id. (citing C.P. KINDREGAN, JR., & M.L. INKER, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.9-
1.10 (3d ed. 2002)). 
 125. Id. (quoting Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123, 129 (1808)). 
 126. Joshua Glenn, Sins of Sodom?, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/06/05/sins_of_sodom/ 
(quoting author David Myers). 
 127. Ellen Goodman, Score One for Cupid, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 2005, 
available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/ 
2005/05/19/score_one_for_cupid/ (quoting Stephanie Coontz). 
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decided not to have children, and elderly heterosexual couples, long 
past their child bearing years, who have decided to marry.  Ironically, 
the defense of marriage movement’s growing political influence 
seems to be in direct proportion to the radical transformation that the 
institution of marriage has undergone in recent times. 
2.  The Rise of DOMAs and the Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
Banning Gay Marriage 
The first state DOMAs were passed by Alaska and Hawaii, both in 
1998.128  Today, there are forty states that have state statutes or 
constitutional amendments banning gay marriage.129  In November 
of 2004 alone, there were eleven states that passed constitutional 
amendments banning gay marriage. 130  Eight of those states banned 
gay civil unions as well.131  Concerned that they might be required to 
recognize civil unions or same sex marriages authorized and 
performed in other states, legislators instituted preventative measures 
like the one in Nebraska, which says: “Only marriage between a man 
and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska.  The uniting of 
two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or 
other similar same sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in 
Nebraska.”132  The Nebraska law was overturned by a federal district 
court judge in May of 2005 in Citizens for Equal Protection v. 
Bruning.133  Bruning will be discussed in greater depth in the 
conclusion section of this Article.134 
In addition to anti-gay marriage initiatives, other anti-gay rights 
initiatives are also underway in several states.  For example, the House 
of Representatives in Texas voted in 2005 to prohibit gays from 
becoming foster parents, and gave the state permission to inquire into 
                                                          
 128. See History of Legal Challenges, supra note 82 (discussing the fight for gay 
marriage, which began in 1971, but did not gain any success until the 1990s when the 
Alaska and Hawaii courts ruled that banning gay marriage was unconstitutional, 
which led the legislatures in those state to pass anti-gay marriage legislative measures). 
 129. See Marriage/Relationship Laws: State by State, supra note 15 (noting that 
lawsuits challenging the denial of same sex marriage have been initiated in California, 
Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut and Oregon). 
 130. See Knickerbocker, supra note 63 (noting that these amendments passed 
despite polls which showed that Americans, particularly young Americans, are 
increasingly likely to favor civil unions to gay marriage). 
 131. See id. (noting that conservatives oppose civil unions because gay activists 
consider civil unions a step towards acceptance of gay marriage). 
 132. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, held unconstitutional by Citizens for Equal Protection 
v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005). 
 133. 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (noting that marriage is among the intimate 
relationships granted protection as an element of personal liberty under the Due 
Process Clause). 
 134. See infra notes 350-68 and accompanying text. 
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the sexual orientation of people who are currently foster parents.135  
In Alabama, one legislator has introduced a bill that would prevent 
public funds from being used to “recognize or promote 
homosexuality as an acceptable lifestyle,” including portraying same 
sex parents in a positive light.136  When asked what would be done 
with existing library books and textbooks depicting same sex parents 
positively, a Georgia representative said: “‘I guess we dig a big hole 
and dump them in and bury them.’”137 
Congress passed the federal DOMA, with the approval of 
Democratic President Bill Clinton, in 1996, which provides: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian 
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or 
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe 
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship.138 
Whether or not federal or state DOMAs or state constitutional bans 
on gay marriage can survive legal challenges brought against them 
under the U.S. Constitution, however, is questionable because the 
Supreme Court will have to apply the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantees of due process and equal protection to the case under 






                                                          
 135. See Knickerbocker, supra note 63 (suggesting that if an investigation reveals 
that those acting as foster parents are gay, the state will remove foster children from 
the home). 
 136. Id. (noting that the proposed legislation would specifically prohibit the use of 
state funds to purchase textbooks and library materials that “promote” 
homosexuality). 
 137. Id. (quoting Rep. Gerald Allen (R)). 
 138. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 2005). 
 139. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (guaranteeing due process and equal protection 
to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States”); see also Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (rejecting the argument that because a statute barring 
interracial marriage resulted in equal penalties to all offenders it did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, and finding that depriving interracial couples of the 
fundamental right to marry violated the Due Process Clause because it was a choice 
that must be left to individuals). 
 140. See infra Part II.B-C (discussing the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and how they relate to gay 
marriage). 
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In light of the above, President Bush has argued: 
Those who want to change the meaning of marriage claim that [the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution] requires all states 
and cities to recognize same-sex marriage performed anywhere in 
America. 
. . . [E]ven if the Defense of Marriage Act is upheld, the law does 
not protect marriage within any state or city.  For all these reasons, 
the defense of marriage requires a constitutional amendment.141 
Early in 2005, just after Bush’s second presidential campaign 
victory, Republican Senator Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) 
“promised that Republicans will again seek to approve a constitutional 
amendment to ban gay marriage.”142  With his confidence bolstered 
by President Bush’s reelection in 2004, Senator Frist declared that “his 
party’s members are coming into the [2005] session with the 
American people on their side.”143 
Republican Congresswoman Marilyn Musgrave of Colorado and five 
co-sponsors introduced the first anti-gay marriage Congressional 
resolution in May of 2003.144  In that same year, Republican Wayne 
Allard of Colorado introduced a companion resolution in the 
Senate.145  Both resolutions provided that: “Marriage in the United 
States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.  Neither 
this Constitution, nor the Constitution of any State, nor State or 
Federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the 
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or 
groups.”146 
However, because the requirements for passing a U.S. 
Constitutional Amendment are extremely rigorous, the chance for 
passage of the resolutions is slim.147  First, such an amendment 
                                                          
 141. Same-sex Marriage: Bush’s Remarks on Marriage Amendment, supra note 
120. 
 142. See Rick Klein, Senate Democrats Coordinate Message, Attack on Bush, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2005, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/ 
washington/articles/2005/01/25/senate_democrats_coordinate_message_attack_on
_bush/ (highlighting the priorities of both Democratic and Republican leaders of the 
Senate for the year, and noting that in 2004 supporters of a constitutional 
amendment came up nineteen votes short of moving forward in the Senate). 
 143. See id. (noting that Senator Frist also appealed to Democratic Senators to 
acknowledge the support Republicans received when seeking compromises). 
 144. See H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (using the increasing power of the 
Republican Party to introduce the constitutional amendment defining marriage as 
between a man and a woman). 
 145. See S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003) (echoing the House Resolution calling 
for an anti-gay marriage constitutional amendment). 
 146. S.J. Res. 26.; H.R.J. Res. 56. 
 147. See Sheldon Alberts, Bush Bid to Ban Gay Marriage is Just Talk, NATIONAL 
POST, Feb. 27, 2004, at A10 (pointing out that since the adoption of the U.S. 
Constitution in 1787, legislators have amended it twenty-seven times but have failed 
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requires support from two-thirds of both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, as well as three-fourths of the States.148  Second, it is 
not clear that either President Bush or Senator Frist will be able to get 
the level of support needed from their own party members to pass an 
amendment.  Republican party members’ stance cannot easily be 
identified.  For instance, Montana Senator Conrad Burns has said that 
“he is ‘very cool to the idea of an amendment’ because he opposes 
government intervention in family matters.”149  Other Republicans, 
including California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, also have 
refused to support the proposed amendment, because they are “loath 
to support a federal initiative that treads on their jurisdiction to 
legislate family relationships.”150 
In the absence of a constitutional amendment, the future of gay 
marriage rests in the hands of the courts.  In 2005 alone there were a 
series of conflicting rulings addressing this issue in different state 
courts around the country.151  On one coast a New York state court 
judge decided that the New York Constitution’s Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses were not violated when a same sex couple was 
prevented from marrying,152 while on the other coast the Oregon 
Supreme Court ruled that a gay marriage was not valid because it 
violated Oregon’s DOMA153 and a California court decided that the 
State’s new law limiting marriage to heterosexuals was valid under 
California law.154 
Any state law or court decision that gives rise to issues covered by 
the U.S. Constitution, however, is subject to review in the federal 
court system and can ultimately lead to a case being heard by the U.S. 
                                                          
on more than eleven thousand occasions). 
 148. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that “whenever two thirds of both Houses 
deem it necessary . . . when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several 
States,” the Constitution may be amended); see also Marriage/Relationship Laws: 
State by State, supra note 15 (noting that forty states currently ban gay marriage). 
 149. Alberts, supra note 147 (quoting Senator Conrad Burns). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Compare Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861 (2005) (finding no 
constitutional right to gay marriage under the New York Constitution), and Li v. 
State, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005) (finding Oregon can properly limit marriage to 
only between a man and woman), with Knight v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 26 
Cal.Rptr.3d 687, 687 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a domestic partnership provision 
did not violate the California Constitution). 
 152. See Seymour, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (noting that the decision to extend 
marriage to gay couples must be made by the legislature, not the courts). 
 153. See Li, 110 P.3d at 102 (finding that a county lacked the authority to issue 
marriage licenses to same sex couples, rendering all such marriage licenses void). 
 154. See Knight, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d at 699 (describing the differences between the 
rights enjoyed by married couples and the rights granted to couples in domestic 
partnerships, including the inability of domestic partners to file joint tax returns or to 
receive many government benefits). 
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Supreme Court.155  There are a host of constitutional provisions that 
are triggered by these decisions, all of which will be examined in the 
next section.156 
II.  THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATES’ RIGHT TO REGULATE 
MARRIAGE VS. THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
A.  The Tenth Amendment and State Police Powers 
It is not possible to talk about how the federal courts will resolve the 
gay marriage debate without first examining the Tenth Amendment 
to the Constitution, which provides: “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”157  The 
powers referred to in the Tenth Amendment are commonly referred 
to as the state’s “police powers,” which include “[t]he power to make 
any and all laws deemed necessary for the protection of the public 
health, safety, welfare, and morals.”158  Generally, courts have ruled 
that the Tenth Amendment grants states the right to regulate 
marriages that take place within their borders.159 
As mentioned previously, pro-DOMA advocates believe that state 
enacted DOMAs can be justified on Tenth Amendment grounds 
because, in their view, homosexuality in general, and gay marriage in 
particular, are immoral.160  They believe states should therefore have 
the right to regulate this kind of conduct vis-a-vis states’ police powers.  
State laws restricting marriage, however, must also not be in conflict 
with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution.161  The extent to which the courts 
have used the Fourteenth Amendment to place boundaries around 
                                                          
 155. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (providing that the United States Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over controversies that have resulted in conflicting decisions from federal 
courts of appeals, conflicting decisions from state courts of last resort, or that involve 
an important question of federal law that remains unsettled). 
 156. See infra Part II.A-C (discussing the Tenth Amendment, Due Process Clause 
and Equal Protection Clause as they relate to gay marriage). 
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 158. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR. & JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94 
(2d ed. 1999). 
 159. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 
2003) (stating that “civil marriage is created and regulated through exercise of the 
police power”). 
 160. See, e.g., Southern Baptist Convention, supra note 119 (declaring that gay 
marriage goes against God’s laws). 
 161. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (finding that a prohibition on gay 
marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment and produced “a deep and scarring 
hardship on a very real segment of the community for no rational reason”). 
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states’ police powers with respect to marriage will be discussed next. 
B.  The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses 
Passed by Congress during the racially and politically tumultuous 
years following the end of the Civil War in 1868, the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall . . . deprive any person life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”162  Although the Amendment is written 
in broad, racially neutral terms, it was initially intended to protect the 
rights of newly freed slaves, most of whom were prevented from 
participating fully as citizens by whites who found the prospect of 
black liberty and equality threatening to their way of life.163  There is 
therefore a long tradition of legal jurisprudence in which the courts 
have used the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down laws and 
policies that attempted to promote racial discrimination.164  Over the 
last 140 years, however, there has also been a steady and continuous 
trend in the courts to allow the Fourteenth Amendment to be used to 
overturn laws and policies that have nothing to do with race or the 
rights of the descendants of slaves.165  This in turn has allowed gay 
rights advocates to lay claim to the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
promises, especially in the area of marriage rights. 
In the 1967 case Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court used the 
Fourteenth Amendment to overturn a Virginia state anti-
miscegenation law that made it a crime for African-Americans and 
whites to marry.166 
1.  Loving v. Virginia 
The plaintiffs in Loving were a black woman and her white 
husband.167  Originally residents of Virginia, they left the State in 
                                                          
 162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 163. See Toni Lester, Context, Contention and the Constitution: Riding the Waves 
of the Affirmative Action Debate, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67 (2005) (discussing the 
original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the challenges to black equality in 
the years following the Civil War). 
 164. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s 
anti-miscegenation statute as “directly subversive to the principle of equality at the 
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 165. See Lester, supra note 163. 
 166. See 388 U.S. at 2 (distinguishing between statutes based on racial 
classifications and those based on other distinctions, and holding that the statutes 
based on racial classifications were subject to much more rigorous scrutiny because 
they had no rational basis). 
 167. See id. (noting that the plaintiffs that sought to get married were Mildred 
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1958 to marry in the District of Columbia, where it was legal for them 
to do so.168  They then returned to Virginia, whereupon they were 
tried and convicted under Section 20-58 of the state criminal code, 
which stated: 
If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for 
the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, 
and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, 
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished . . . and the 
marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been 
solemnized in this State.169 
At the time of the ruling, there were sixteen states in the U.S. that 
outlawed interracial marriage, including Delaware, Tennessee and 
Alabama, and fourteen states that had repealed such laws.170  The 
California Supreme Court was the first court to declare such laws 
illegal under the Equal Protection clause in the 1948 case, Perez v. 
Sharp.171 
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the Lovings’ convictions, 
finding that the State had a legitimate interest in preserving “the 
racial integrity of its citizens, . . . [preventing] the corruption of blood 
. . . and the obliteration of racial pride.”172  The Virginia Court also 
ruled that the states have an exclusive right under the Tenth 
Amendment to regulate marriage within their boundaries. 173  The 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if these 
assertions were correct.174 
Delivering the opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Warren said that the Virginia law violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, notwithstanding 
the fact that it penalized whites and blacks equally.175  Because the 
                                                          
Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man). 
 168. See id. at 2-3 (stating that after their convictions in Virginia, the Lovings 
returned to the District of Columbia because the laws in the District allowed them to 
live together as man and wife, while in Virginia living together was a legal basis for a 
presumption that they were married, and therefore in violation of Virginia’s laws). 
 169. Id. at 4 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (Michie 1960) (repealed 1967)). 
 170. See id. at 6 (noting that the initiation of litigation in this case compelled 
Maryland to repeal its statute barring interracial marriages). 
 171. See 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948) (holding that the California statutes 
arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminated against certain racial groups). 
 172. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)). 
 173. See id. (noting that although the State claimed the power to regulate 
marriage, it did not argue that the power to regulate marriage was unlimited in light 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 174. See id. at 2 (noting that the case presented a constitutional question never 
addressed by the Court of whether a state statute barring interracial marriage violated 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 175. See id. at 12 (holding that depriving citizens of the fundamental right to 
28
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss2/2
2006] ADAM AND STEVE VS. ADAM AND EVE 281 
state statute involved racial classifications, Warren observed that it was 
not exempt “from the very heavy burden of justification which the 
Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes 
drawn according to race.”176  Countering arguments made by the 
State that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment never intended 
for it to eliminate anti-miscegenation laws, Warren declared that 
“[w]hile these statements have some relevance to the intention of 
Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be 
understood that they . . . [do not pertain] to the broader, organic 
purpose of a constitutional amendment.”177  Warren also noted that 
racial discrimination of the type covered in the Virginia statute had to 
be subjected to the “most rigid scrutiny,”178 and unless there was a 
separate and distinct, permissible, objective reason for the 
discrimination, laws furthering it could not stand.179  He declared 
that “[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding purpose 
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this 
classification . . . .  [Its sole purpose is] to maintain White 
Supremacy.”180 
Justice Warren also decided that the Virginia law was 
unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: “The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.”181  As such, he argued that 
“[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to 
our very existence and survival.”182  “To deny this fundamental 
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications 
embodied in these statutes,” he said, “is surely to deprive all the 
State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”183  Thus, he 
concluded, it is the individual, not the state, that has the right to 
decide if they are going to marry a person of another race.184 
                                                          
marry based on racial distinctions was “directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 176. Id. at 9. 
 177. Id. (emphasis added). 
 178. Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). 
 179. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court had already declared that there is no 
valid legislative purpose for using the color of a person’s skin as the test for 
criminality). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 12. 
 182. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. (invalidating the state’s statutory scheme restricting interracial 
marriage and mandating that white persons only marry other white persons on the 
basis that such restrictions violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
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The Loving decision is extremely important to the gay marriage 
issue for the following reasons.  First, the Court ruled that the right to 
marry is a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.185  
Second, Justice Warren made it clear that religion should not play a 
role in the development of laws designed to discriminate based on 
race.186  Also, while he recognized that states do have the right to 
manage the morality and welfare of their residents in such areas as 
marriage, he said that this is not an exclusive right.187  Finally, Warren 
outlined the standard of review that should be used in Fourteenth 
amendment cases where racial discrimination is the chief motivating 
force behind a government law or policy.188  That standard, which 
Warren refers to as the “rigid scrutiny” standard, is today called the 
“strict scrutiny test.”189 
C.  Standards of Review in Fourteenth Amendment Cases and 
Disputes About Which Standard to Apply to Sexual Orientation 
Claims 
Generally, there are three levels of review that courts use to 
determine equal protection issues.190  The strict scrutiny test is 
considered the most rigorous test of the three.191  The test relates to 
the proposition that some kinds of discrimination are inherently 
suspect, such as discrimination based on religion, race, ethnicity or 
fundamental rights like the right the right to privacy.192  It requires 
                                                          
Constitution). 
 185. See id. (holding that “[m]arriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, 
fundamental to our very existence”). 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. at 7 (stating that the state’s power in the Tenth Amendment to 
regulate marriage is limited by the proscriptions of Fourteenth Amendment). 
 188. See id. at 11 (holding that rigid scrutiny must be used when racial 
classifications are made in criminal statutes). 
 189. See id. (finding that rigid scrutiny demands that the statute “must be shown to 
be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent 
of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
eliminate”). 
 190. See STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 739-41 (explaining that the three 
tests courts use in equal protection cases, rational basis, strict scrutiny, and 
heightened scrutiny, to determine a statute or action’s constitutional validity vary in 
terms of scrutiny levels and shifting burdens of proof, with the rational basis test 
providing the easiest test for a statute or state action to pass, and strict scrutiny 
providing a more difficult test). 
 191. See id. at 739-40 (describing the strict scrutiny test as difficult, if not 
impossible, for the government to satisfy because it removes the statute’s presumption 
of constitutionality, shifts the burden of proof to the government, and requires the 
government to show that it has a compelling interest for ethnic discrimination). 
 192. See id. (outlining the historical development of the strict scrutiny test and 
explaining that the test shifts the burden of proof to the government or state to show 
that the statute or policy in question serves some sort of compelling interest); see also 
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courts to overturn government laws or policies that discriminate on 
these grounds unless it can be shown that there is a sufficiently 
compelling government interest in furthering those laws or policies, 
and that the means used to advance that interest are narrowly 
tailored.193  In addition to Loving, a long line of cases have reinforced 
the notion that the strict scrutiny test should be applied to state and 
federal laws and policies that discriminate against people on racial 
grounds.194 
In addition to the strict scrutiny test, courts employ two other tests 
in Fourteenth Amendment cases.  The second most rigorous test, 
called the intermediate or heightened scrutiny test, requires that the 
government show “that a challenged policy bears a ‘substantial’ 
relationship to an ‘important’ government interest.”195  Courts have 
ruled that the heightened scrutiny analysis is the test that should be 
applied to sex discrimination cases.196  The least rigorous test, called 
the “rational basis test,”197 allows courts to uphold laws if those laws 
are supported by a legitimate government purpose and the means 
used to accomplish that purpose are rationally related to it.198  The 
                                                          
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that “if a law neither burdens a 
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative 
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end) (citing 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320 (1993)). 
 193. See STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 739-40 (describing the courts’ duty 
to subject any statute or state action that discriminates on the basis of race to the most 
rigid scrutiny, as set forth in Korematsu v. Untited States, and explaining that courts 
must hold the government to a very high burden of proof to show that its statute or 
action is valid). 
 194. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (striking 
down a city ordinance that awarded a certain percentage of public contracts to 
minority contractors only because it excluded other non-minority business owners 
from consideration for some public contracts on the basis of  race); Adarand 
Construction v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-239 (1995) (maintaining that government 
statutes and actions involving racial classification are still subject to strict scrutiny 
analysis, stressing the importance of narrowly tailoring any such statutes that serve a 
compelling government interest, and remanding the case to lower court so that the 
court could apply the strict scrutiny test to a federal program that awarded contracts 
to disadvantaged businesses). 
 195. STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 741. 
 196. See Sidney Buchanan, Affirmative Action: The Many Shades of Justice, 39 
HOUS. L. REV. 149, 157-58 (2002) (comparing the tests that courts use to assess the 
constitutionality of racially and gender based affirmative action programs and laws, 
and noting that courts have normally considered gender inequality to be an 
“important” interest justifying legislation that distinguishes between men and women, 
whereas they have been less willing to classify the government’s use of racial 
classifications in the same way) (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)). 
 197. STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 739. 
 198. See id. (explaining that the rationale basis reflected a more conservative 
activism in the Supreme Court in the first half of the twentieth century, and thus, the 
test is usually a lesser standard for the government to satisfy when parties challenge its 
legislation or action’s constitutionality, but its application is limited to certain types of 
constitutional challenges, usually not involving racial classification). 
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rational basis test is the primary standard of review in cases involving 
business regulation.199  Cases “under rational basis review normally 
pass constitutional muster, since ‘the Constitution presumes that even 
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
processes.’”200 
The above three tiers of review largely exist to accommodate 
competing claims that have emerged since the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  Because the amendment was 
initially enacted to level the playing field for freed African-American 
slaves and their descendants denied basic civil rights and liberties after 
the end of the Civil War, “[t]he first step in . . . [any Fourteenth 
Amendment] analysis is to categorize the class affected as more or less 
similar to race based on certain judicially-developed criteria.”201  
Claimants hoping to get suspect class protection are thus evaluated in 
order to see if they were subjected to “historical discrimination, 
political powerlessness . . . [or if they have] immutable characteristics 
[akin to race] . . . .  In addition to race (the original suspect class), 
alienage and national origin have also been recognized as suspect.”202  
As mentioned above, the mid-tier standard of review is reserved for 
classifications based on gender.  The balance is usually left for almost 
all business regulation, which, as also stated previously, “[is] 
presumptively constitutional and will be upheld if rationally related to 
any conceivable, legitimate government interest.”203 
The question of what test should be applied to sexual orientation 
discrimination claims, however, has been the subject if much dispute 
in the courts.  Is sexual orientation discrimination similar to race and 
thus deserving of strict scrutiny treatment?  Or should it be subject to 
                                                          
 199. See id. (citing the example of a state regulation requiring medical licenses for 
psychiatrists to serve the legitimate state interest of protecting public health and safety 
as illustrative of the way in which a court might apply the rational basis test to 
legislation aimed at a certain class of persons). 
 200. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). 
 201. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 871 (Vt. 1999) (citing Personnel Administrator 
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)); see also JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 253-64 (1983) 
(concluding that the question of whether a classification is similar to race is the 
wrong kind of analysis to be undertaken when doing an Equal Protection Clause test); 
Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2441-44 (1994) 
(comparing  suspect classifications to the anti-caste principle, which aims to prevent 
second-class status for various groups in society, and noting that under both 
principles, courts consider such factors as political power, immutable characteristics, 
and discrimination history to determine if a class is entitled to protection from 
suspect legislation, but recognizing the definitional problems that courts have when 
they try to define and analyze these factors, and that the analysis under the anti-caste 
principle may yield different results from the suspect classification analysis). 
 202. Baker, 744 A.2d at 871 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41). 
 203. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)). 
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the less taxing standards associated with sex discrimination or 
economic discrimination, respectively?  In the 1997 case, Equality 
Foundation v. City of Cincinnati,204 a federal appeals court ruled that 
since homosexual conduct was legally criminal at the time, gays could 
not claim suspect class status.205  But in the 1998 case, Tanner v. 
Oregon Health Sciences University,206 the Oregon Court of Appeals 
declared that gays were a suspect class because they were a socially 
recognized group that was the target of negative political and social 
stereotyping and prejudice.207  Thus, the Oregon court concluded 
that a government employer’s practice of denying health insurance 
benefits to heterosexual married couples, but not gay couples, was 
unconstitutional under Oregon state law.208 
I have argued elsewhere that that sexual orientation discrimination 
is much like sex discrimination because homophobia is largely 
motivated by a desire to punish gay people for failing to conform to 
traditional stereotypes about how men and women are supposed to 
behave.209  As my analysis in Part I showed, outdated, religiously 
inspired notions about the proper roles that men and women should 
play in and outside of marriage all surface in arguments made by pro-
DOMA advocates.210  The natural state for men and women is 
heterosexuality, the argument goes.  Marriage, procreation and 
                                                          
 204. 128 F.3d  289 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 205. See id. at 292-93 (rejecting the heightened scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny 
tests for constitutional validity of legislation in analyzing a city ordinance that 
removed sexual orientation from a statute defining protected classes, because the 
court did not believe that homosexuality was a suspect or quasi-suspect class). 
 206. 971 P.2d  435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
 207. See id. at 447 (denying that the University’s policy that homosexual 
employees could not receive health benefits for their domestic partners violated a 
state statute, but holding that the policy violated the Oregon Constitution because 
homosexuals were a “suspect class,” and therefore, policies aimed at or affecting this 
class differently must be subject to strict scrutiny). 
 208. See id. (reasoning that the University’s policy violated constitutional 
principles because homosexuals were a distinct social class which had been 
discriminated against socially and politically, and because Oregon did not have a valid 
reason to justify providing benefits for heterosexual married couples, but not 
domestic partners). 
 209. See generally Toni Lester, Protecting the Gender Nonconformist from the 
Gender Police: Why the Harassment of Gays and Other Gender Nonconformists Is a 
Form of Sex Discrimination in Light of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Oncale v. 
Sundowner, 29 N.M. L. REV. 89 (1999) (explaining the connection between 
stereotypes about gender and identity and discrimination against homosexuals in 
society and advocating that those in the legal profession use this connection to better 
argue for increased protection for homosexual rights in harassment and 
discrimination cases). 
 210. See infra Part I (defining the varying definitions and conceptions of marriage, 
such as the difference between legal and religious definitions of marriage, and the 
difference between older concepts of marriage as more of a “mercenary” relationship 
and more modern concepts that see marriage as more of a romantic union). 
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raising children should be the ultimate desire of all heterosexuals.  
Under this line of reasoning, gay people are traitors to their biological 
sex, a perversion in the eyes of God.  Because homophobia has its 
roots in this kind of sexist thinking and reasoning, right to marry 
claims should be subjected to the heightened scrutiny test normally 
used in sex discrimination cases.  Under the heightened scrutiny test, 
it would be very hard for a state DOMA to withstand constitutional 
attack, since, as the discussion below will show, none of the typical 
reasons offered by states to justify the passage of DOMAs (i.e., 
preservation of the tradition, safeguarding morality, and protecting 
children from gay parents) sufficiently articulates an important or 
provable government interest worth preserving.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court took up this issue in the 1996 case, Romer v. Evans.211 
1.  Romer v. Evans and the Court’s Use of the Rational Basis Test for 
Sexual Orientation 
The Supreme Court had to decide in Romer which of the above 
tests to apply in a case involving government based sexual orientation 
discrimination.212  In the early 1990s, certain Colorado cities like 
Boulder and Denver enacted laws that prohibited various forms of 
discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.213  For example, 
the City of Boulder passed a law that prevented such discrimination in 
“any place of business engaged in any sales to the general public and 
any place that offers services, facilities, privileges, or advantages to the 
general public or that receives financial support through solicitation 
of the general public or through governmental subsidy of any 
kind.”214  In response to these developments, the citizens of Colorado 
passed a statewide referendum in 1992 amending the state 
constitution.215  The amendment prevented any kind of “legislative, 
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government 
designed to protect” gays, bisexuals and lesbians from ever being 
                                                          
 211. See 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (evaluating a Colorado constitutional 
amendment that would prohibit the state executive, legislator, or courts from 
enacting laws or taking action that aimed to protect homosexuals from 
discrimination, and concluding after applying a rational basis test, that the state did 
not have a legitimate interest that was rationally related to this legislation). 
 212. See id. at 634-35 (deciding that the standard to be used is that a law must have 
a rational basis to the legitimate government interest that it looks to further). 
 213. See id. at 623 (stating that these statutes looked to end “discrimination in 
many transactions and activities, including housing, employment, education, public 
accommodations, and health and welfare services”). 
 214. Id. at 628 (citing BOULDER REV. CODE § 12-1-1(j) (1987)). 
 215. See id. at 623 (stating that the citizens of Colorado voted to adopt 
Amendment 2 in response to the municipal ordinances). 
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passed.216  It made illegal any law or policy “whereby homosexual, 
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships 
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or 
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota 
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.”217 
Several gay claimants challenged the amendment in court on the 
grounds that it would subject them to the risk of discrimination and 
leave them without any recourse.218  Laws in place at the time that the 
amendment would negate included the governor’s executive order 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination against state 
government workers,219 and government policies outlawing sexual 
orientation discrimination on state college campuses.220  The state 
argued that the new constitutional amendment was legal because it 
simply put gays on the same level playing ground as everyone else, by 
not granting them special rights.221 
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy disagreed: 
The amendment imposes a special disability upon . . . [gays] alone . 
. . .  Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or 
may seek without constraint . . . .  This is so no matter how local or 
discrete the harm, no matter how public and widespread the injury 
. . . these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless 
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic 
life in a free society.222 
Furthermore, he noted, the amendment’s “sheer breadth is so 
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment 
seems inexplicable by anything butanimus toward the class it affects; it 
                                                          
 216. See id. at 624 (citing the text of the amendment, and noting that its intended 
and practical effect would be to not only repeal the existing ordinances that define 
homosexuals and bisexuals as a protected class, but also to prevent future legislation 
or judicial decisions that would do the same). 
 217. See id. (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b). 
 218. See id. at 625 (outlining the plaintiffs’ argument that the amendment would 
put them at a “substantial risk “for discrimination and that the amendment would 
repeal additional laws not mentioned in the amendment). 
 219. See id. at 629 (citing Colo. Exec. Order No. D0035 (Dec. 10, 1990)) 
(explaining that the state executive order prohibited “employment discrimination for 
‘all state employees, classified and exempt’ on the basis of sexual orientation”). 
 220. See id. (highlighting the fact that the amendment would affect not only 
legislation protecting gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, but also, would prohibit such 
protection through policies, as the amendment also repealed state college policies 
that protected homosexuals as a class from discrimination). 
 221. See id. at 626 (contrasting the state’s argument that the amendment only 
denies special treatment for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, rather than denying specific 
rights, with the state court’s interpretation of the amendment as aimed at legislation 
involving homosexual rights only). 
 222. Id. at 631. 
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lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”223  With 
respect to this last point, Kennedy observed that he could see no 
legitimate reason for such a law to be passed except for homosexual 
animus.224  As such, he concluded, “a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.”225 
Aside from two earlier cases in which the Court struck down laws 
making gay magazines per se obscene and therefore not shippable by 
U.S. mail,226 the Romer case marks the first time the U.S. Supreme 
Court outlawed the practice of targeting gays for discrimination just 
because they are gay.  As the language used by Justice Kennedy also 
suggests, the Court applied the rational basis test to determine that 
the Colorado amendment was unconstitutional.227  Laws making it 
harder for one group of citizens to seek help from the government, as 
opposed to others, are contrary to the Fourteenth amendment’s equal 
protection clause,228 Kennedy explains, because “central both to the 
idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of 
equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts 
remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.”229 
Kennedy’s decision in Romer should be applauded for its pro-gay 
stance.  However, because he used the rational basis test to overturn 
the Colorado law, as opposed to the heightened scrutiny test, it was 
also possible at the time to think that states still had some leeway to 
enact other kinds of laws that discriminated against gays, as long as 
those laws were designed to support newly articulated interests that 
made sense to the Court.  As it turned out, Kennedy was not willing to 
                                                          
 223. Id. at 632 (emphasis added). 
 224. See id. (reasoning that an amendment that is so broad and imposes burdens 
on one group, homosexuals, “defies,” rather than fails, the requirements of 
Constitutional analysis). 
 225. Id. at 634-35 (quoting Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 
(1973)). 
 226. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that a 
magazine that promoted homosexuality and lesbianism was not mailable), rev’d, 355 
U.S. 371 (1958); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (reversing the 
lower court decision that determined certain magazines with semi-nude male models 
and possibly advertising obscene material were a violation of a federal statute 
prohibiting people from mailing such materials because the magazines did not fall 
under the Court’s definition of obscenity). 
 227. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32 (applying the rational basis test to the 
amendment in question and concluding that there is no way in which a statute that is 
so broad in scope and targets a particular group could rationally serve a legitimate 
state purpose). 
 228. See id. at 633 (explaining that such laws violate the group members’ equal 
protection rights, as did the Colorado amendment in this case when it precluded gays 
specifically from government protections). 
 229. Id. 
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entertain such interests in the next gay rights case to come before the 
Court, Lawrence v. Texas, and he essentially took up where he left off 
in Romer, continuing his use of the rational basis test to overturn 
Texas’ anti-sodomy laws.230 
2.  Lawrence v. Texas 
In Lawrence, the Houston police arrested two adult men, John 
Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, when the police entered 
Lawrence’s home and found the two men having consensual sex.231  
The state convicted the two men under a Texas state statute, making it 
a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in “deviate sexual 
intercourse.”232  Deviate sexual intercourse was defined as “any 
contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth 
or anus of another person; or . . . the penetration of the genitals or 
the anus of another person with an object.”233 
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion for the majority, said that 
there were three issues in dispute: 1) whether the statute violated the 
plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of 
equal protection; 2) whether the statute violated the plaintiffs’ rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process; and 
3) whether or not Bowers v. Harwick,234 the 1986 Supreme Court case 
upholding Georgia’s anti-sodomy law, should be overturned.235  In 
Bowers, the Court let stand a Georgia statute that made it a crime for 
both heterosexuals and gay people to engage in sodomy.236 
                                                          
 230. See 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (acknowledging that the Equal Protection 
Clause analysis could be relevant to determining if a Texas criminal statute 
prohibiting homosexual sodomy was constitutionally invalid, but ultimately declining 
to expand Romer, and requiring that the government show a substantial interest in 
prohibiting sodomy). 
 231. See id. at 562 (stating that the police were called to the home in response to a 
purported claim of weapons being fired). 
 232. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2005), declared 
unconstitutional by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (prohibiting deviate sexual intercourse 
between members of the same sex and noting that violators are subject to a Class C 
misdemeanor). 
 233. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1). 
 234. See 48 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that a state statute 
prohibiting sodomy was unconstitutional and denying that the Due Process Clause 
provided a right to engage in homosexual sodomy). 
 235. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (outlining the possible questions the court 
could answer in the case, including whether or not the statute violates Due Process or 
Equal Protection Clauses, and whether the Court should overturn the Bowers 
decision, and ultimately concluding that the Court could decide the case on due 
process grounds). 
 236. See Bowers, 48 U.S. at 189 (reversing the lower court’s decision that the 
plaintiff’s due process rights were violated when he was not allowed to engage in 
sodomy because it interfered with his privacy and association rights, and holding that 
the Georgia statute was valid). 
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Justice Kennedy, who was joined in his opinion by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, ruled that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 
Amendment due process liberty rights were infringed upon when they 
were arrested.237  Justice Kennedy states: 
[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines 
of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their 
dignity as free persons.  When sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more enduring.  The liberty 
protected by the [Due Process Clause of the] Constitution allows 
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.238 
Justice Kennedy also said that Bowers should be overturned because 
it is not good law now nor was it good law at the time it was 
decided.239  Our stare decisis system requires judges to grant great 
deference to precedent because society has a right to rely on the 
stability that judicial decisions produce, he noted.240  Furthermore, of 
the nine states that had anti-sodomy laws on the books before Bowers 
was decided, many failed to enforce those laws and many abolished 
them altogether after the decision was rendered, and, thus, he said, 
the stability argument had no weight.241  Furthermore, although the 
majority court in Bowers said that there was ample evidence to 
support the proposition that homosexuality has always been a crime 
in America, Justice Kennedy noted that more recent historical 
scholarship in this area contradicts that assertion.242  Finally, and most 
                                                          
 237. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (contrasting the consensual conduct between 
two adults that the petitioners engaged in, with the type of conduct that might justify 
government interference, such as prostitution or child abuse, and holding that the 
statute in question violated the petitioner’s due process liberty rights to privacy). 
 238. Id. at 567. 
 239. See id. at 577-78 (stating that “there has been no individual or societal 
reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once 
there are compelling reasons to do so.  Bowers itself causes uncertainty, for the 
precedents before and after its issuance contradicts its central holding.”).  It is also 
important to note that Bowers involved a law that made same sex and opposite sex 
sodomy a crime, although the law tended to be targeted only against gays, whereas 
the law under review in Lawrence only targeted same sex behavior.  Id. at 566. 
 240. See id. at 577 (acknowledging that stare decisis requires the Court’s respect, 
but noting that it is not an unlimited principle, and therefore, if there is compelling 
interest for overturning a decision or if a decision infringes on constitutional liberties, 
the Court may overturn it). 
 241. See id. at 570-71 (comparing states’ approaches to sodomy laws, including 
Oklahoma and Texas, that criminalize sodomy and enforce anti-sodomy statutes, with 
other states such as Tennessee and Montana that have moved to abolish their sodomy 
laws, and with Georgia, which has a sodomy law but chooses not to enforce it). 
 242. See id. at 576 (reasoning that the fact that many scholars and others have 
criticized the decision in Bowers, combined with the fact that many states have chosen 
not to follow it as precedent because they believe it violates homosexuals’ 
constitutional rights, demonstrates that it is not a given consensus that homosexuality 
has always been a crime in the United States) (citing C. FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: 
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importantly, Justice Kennedy said that Bowers needed to be 
overturned because he did not want to leave people with the 
impression that an anti-sodomy statute that targeted both gays and 
heterosexuals was constitutional under the equal protection clause 
because it treated similarly situated people the same.243 
Justice Kennedy eloquently articulated a host of reasons for his 
ruling in Lawrence.244  His rationale reads like a history lesson in the 
jurisprudence of privacy rights, equal protection and due process law, 
especially as these three areas of constitutional law relate to a person’s 
right to autonomy over their own body and sexuality.245  Four 
particular cases that Kennedy used to bolster his conclusions were 
Griswold v. Connecticut,246 Eisenstadt v. Baird,247 Carey v. Population 
Services International,248 and Roe v. Wade.249 
Griswold involved a challenge to a Connecticut state statute that 
made it a crime punishable by sixty days in jail for anyone who used 
                                                          
ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (1991); R. POSER, SEX 
AND REASON 341-50 (1992)). 
 243. See id. at 574-75 (explaining that if the Court were to use the Equal 
Protection Clause to invalidate the decision in Bowers or the Texas statute, states 
might be able to circumvent the protection by including more classes of people 
under an anti-sodomy statute, and that this risk was not worth taking when the Court 
could invalidate both the case and the statute using the Due Process Clause, which 
furthers many of the same equal protection interests). 
 244. See id. at 564-67 (elaborating on several bases for the Court’s decision to 
overturn Bowers and invalidate the Texas statute, including several substantive rights 
arising from due process rights, equal protection interests, and historical evidence 
that runs contrary to the idea that sodomy is a crime in the United States). 
 245. See id. (discussing the various rights that the Court has used over the past half 
century to invalidate state actions or legislation that violates due process rights, 
including substantive individual rights to privacy, spatial integrity and control over 
one’s own body, and privacy and freedom within marital and other intimate 
relationships, and noting that these interests are similar to those involved in 
homosexual relationships including the rights to privacy and control over one’s own 
body, and privacy in a consensual adult relationship). 
 246. See id. at 564-65 (noting that the Court in Griswold invalidated a state statute 
prohibiting the use of birth control, as well as aiding and abetting others using birth 
control, because it violated due process rights by infringing on privacy rights, and 
explaining that the decision was relevant to the analysis in Lawrence because it 
involved privacy in intimate relationships) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 485 (1965)). 
 247. See 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a state statute that prohibited the sale 
and distribution of contraceptives to non-married people without authorization 
because the Court could not find a reasonable purpose for distinguishing non-
married from married people in the statute, and thus, that the statute violated the 
equal protection clause). 
 248. See 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that a state statute restricting birth control 
sales to people over sixteen and only by licensed pharmacists or physicians was 
unconstitutional because it burdened an individual’s right to make a decision about 
his or her own reproduction without serving a compelling government interest). 
 249. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a state statute prohibiting abortion on 
the grounds that it interfered with a woman’s personal liberty as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment without serving a compelling interest). 
39
Lester: Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
292 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 14:2 
contraceptives or for doctors who proscribed contraceptives or 
counseled people on their use.250  One of the plaintiffs was a doctor 
who had given medical advice to married women on how to protect 
against getting pregnant, and was convicted under the statute.251  
Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the Court.252  Key to the 
question of whether or not the law was unconstitutional, he observed, 
was how it should interpret the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s 
mandate that people have a right to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures conducted by the government, as well as the First 
Amendment’s free association guarantees and the Third 
Amendment’s prohibitions against the housing of soldiers in private 
homes during peacetime.253  All of these amendments, said Douglas, 
create a series of “penumbral rights of privacy and repose,”254 which 
in turn produce a “zone of privacy,”255 on which married couples 
should be able to rely.  He asked, “Would we allow the police to 
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of 
the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is repulsive to the notions of 
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”256 
Justice Goldberg, in his concurrence, used the strict scrutiny test to 
determine the constitutionality of the Connecticut law.257  He said 
that the state’s excuse that the law was designed to regulate extra-
marital relations was not compelling enough to justify its 
enforcement.258  The case also made some pronouncements about 
                                                          
 250. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (West 1958) (repealed 1971) (prohibiting 
the use of contraceptives and providing for penalties for violations of this rule). 
 251. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (asserting that the appellant was a “licensed 
physician and a professor at the Yale Medical School who served as Medical Director 
for the [Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut]”). 
 252. See id. at 480-86 (stating that three other Justices concurred with Justice 
Douglas, two other Justices concurred in judgment, and two Justices dissented). 
 253. See id. at 484-85 (defining the various rights that derive from Constitutional 
Amendments and explaining that the right claimed in this case, the right to use birth 
control without interference from the state, derives from the concept of privacy, 
which is implied in the guarantees of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments). 
 254. Id. at 485 (dictating that the existence of these penumbras is made evident by 
the many controversies in which the Court has adjudicated the right to privacy). 
 255. Id. at 484. 
 256. Id. at 485-86. 
 257. See id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (finding the right to privacy in the 
Constitution to be a fundamental right and asserting that when a fundamental right 
has been abridged by a state, strict scrutiny must apply). 
 258. See id. at 497-98 (Goldberg. J., concurring) (declaring that Connecticut 
merely asserted a rational relation between the statute and its legitimate state goal 
when it stated that “preventing the use of birth-control devices by married persons 
helps prevent the indulgence by some in such extra-marital relations”). 
40
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss2/2
2006] ADAM AND STEVE VS. ADAM AND EVE 293 
the special nature of marriage that have particular significance to the 
gay marriage issue: 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It is an 
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in 
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or 
social projects.  Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any 
involved in our prior decisions.259 
Justice Goldberg was not willing to cast his protective net around 
gay Americans, however.  He distinguished heterosexual marital rights 
from the rights of adulteresses and homosexuals to engage in sexual 
practices prohibited by the state: 
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which 
the State forbids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is 
necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of 
marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but 
which always and in every age it has fostered and protected.260 
Thus, after Court determined its decision in Griswold, the 
government could no longer enter the bedrooms of married 
heterosexuals, but single heterosexuals and all homosexuals were still 
fair game. 
Later decisions rendered in the next decade, however, expanded 
on the principles outlined in Griswold, and announced that even 
unmarried heterosexuals had a right to the zone of privacy that 
Douglas articulated.261  For instance, in the 1972 case, Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, the Court ruled on equal protection grounds that state laws 
making it illegal for unmarried people to use contraceptives were also 
illegal.262  It said, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”263  And in 
                                                          
 259. Id. at 486. 
 260. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 261. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447-49 (1972) (rejecting the statute’s 
distinction between married and unmarried people, and holding that both categories 
enjoyed certain privacy rights free from government interference). 
 262. See id. at 438 (reasoning that the state’s given purposes for drawing a 
distinction between married and unmarried people in the statute, to discourage the 
evils of premarital intercourse and preserve the sanctity of the home through self-
restraint, did not meet the lesser, rational basis standard for legislation that interferes 
with equal protection claims, let alone a more stringent compelling interest test 
because the law was unlikely to achieve its intended deterrent purpose in reality, and 
married people could engage in the illicit and immoral behavior the state feared as 
well). 
 263. Id. at 453 (emphasis added). 
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the 1977 decision, Carey v. Population Services International, the 
Court upheld a New York law that prohibited the sale of 
contraceptives to children sixteen years old or younger.264 
The decision in the 1973 case Roe v. Wade also demonstrates the 
Court’s clear movement towards favoring liberty rights connected to a 
person’s sexuality or autonomy over his or her own body.265  In Roe, 
the Court declared that a state law making abortion illegal was 
unconstitutional because it interfered with a woman’s right “to make 
certain fundamental decisions . . . [relating to her liberty interests] . . . 
under the Due Process Clause.”266  Roe also made it clear that laws 
restricting a woman’s right to have an abortion potentially violate her 
constitutional right to privacy.267  The Court then implied that, when 
privacy rights such as this were at stake, the strict scrutiny test needs to 
be applied to determine if those laws are constitutional or not.268  
The Court used strict scrutiny language and said, “Where certain 
‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that regulation 
limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state 
interest,’”269 and the “legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn 
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”270 
Even though he relied on Griswold, Casey, and Roe, Justice 
Kennedy implicitly stated that the proper standard of review in 
Lawrence was the rational basis test, not the strict scrutiny test used in 
these other cases.271  This is evidenced by the fact that he said that 
there was no legitimate state interest that the Texas statute served that 
could possibly justify the invasion of privacy envisioned by the law.272  
This language is usually associated with the rational basis test.273  
                                                          
 264. See 431 U.S. 678, 678-79 (1977) (finding that the New York law had to be 
examined under strict scrutiny because it involved the constraining of a fundamental 
right of whether to bear children or not). 
 265. See 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973) (holding that a Texas statute that made abortion 
illegal except to save the mother’s life was unconstitutional because it violated the 
right to privacy found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 266. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003). 
 267. See 410 U.S. at 153 (suggesting that a state’s denial of such a right would 
detrimentally affect pregnant women by forcing them to give birth and raise a child). 
 268. See id. at 155 (stating that most courts have held that “the right to privacy . . . 
is broad enough to cover the abortion decision,” but the right has limitations). 
 269. Id. (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)). 
 270. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)). 
 271. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (searching for but failing to find a legitimate 
state interest that justifies the Texas anti-sodomy law). 
 272. See id. (finding that Texas cannot demean homosexuals’ existence by 
entering into and regulating their private sexual conduct). 
 273. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (defining the rational basis test as 
searching for a legitimate state interest and seeing if the government’s regulation is 
rationally related to the furthering of that interest). 
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Justice Kennedy could have used one of the other two more 
demanding tests (i.e., strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny) to come 
to his conclusions, but he did not.274  If indeed, as Justice Kennedy 
indicated, fundamental rights were violated in Lawrence, his failure to 
apply a more taxing standard in Lawrence is both confusing and 
potentially troubling.  Confusing because he offers no explanation for 
why he uses a different standard or how the situation in Lawrence 
differs from the privacy rights addressed in Griswold or Roe.  
Troubling because the lesser standard leaves the door open for states 
to successfully offer only a nominal justification for other kinds of 
anti-gay legislation in the future.  As I said previously, the heightened 
scrutiny test is the most appropriate test to use in sexual orientation 
discrimination cases because this is the test used in sex discrimination 
cases, cases with which sexual orientation discrimination claims have 
the most in common.275  Justice Kennedy’s decision, at least 
theoretically, relegates gay claimants to a kind of secondary status 
when compared to women, since discrimination against women is 
subjected to much more rigorous standards of review.276 
Despite his application of the less onerous rational basis test in 
Lawrence, however, Justice Kennedy still determined that 
government-based infringements on certain fundamental rights like 
the right to privacy, even when those rights are the rights of gay 
Americans of any race or gender, will rarely pass even that test’s 
hurdles.277  Whether or not this refusal to approve anti-gay legislation 
will apply to all future gay marriage claims, however, remains unclear. 
In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor also 
endorsed the use of the rational basis test, albeit in more nuanced 
attire.278  She noted that, in cases such as this, where the law is 
designed to hurt a politically marginalized group, “a more searching 
form of rational basis review” is required.279  This more searching test 
appears to be slightly more rigorous than the traditional rational basis 
                                                          
 274. See id. at 565 (comparing Lawrence to cases that found the right of privacy in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to be a fundamental liberty interest, and, thus, 
mandated strict scrutiny review). 
 275. See STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 741 (stating that heightened 
scrutiny, where you must show a “substantial relationship to an important government 
interest,” is the standard most often used for sex discrimination cases). 
 276. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (applying rational basis review to sexual 
orientation discrimination). 
 277. See id. (finding the Texas statute which made homosexual sodomy a crime to 
not pass rational basis review because Texas could not proffer a legitimate state 
interest in regulating private conduct between consenting adults). 
 278. See id. at 579 (O’Connor., J., concurring) (stating that a heightened form of 
rational basis review is to be applied when a law seeks to inhibit personal relationships 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 279. Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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test, which is usually used to uphold laws that hinder economic or tax 
regulation.280  Justice O’Connor focused on the inconsistent 
treatment that the Texas law took to the sexual acts in question when 
she complained that “[s]odomy between opposite-sex partners . . . is 
not a crime in Texas.  That is, Texas treats the same conduct 
differently based solely on the participants.”281  She also said that 
moral animosity towards a particular group can never be a legitimate 
reason for the enactment of a law that is subject to rational basis 
review.282  Justice O’Connor also explained that since Texas rarely 
enforced its sodomy law against gay defendants, “the law serve[d] 
more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals 
than as a tool to stop criminal behavior.”283  This, combined with the 
fact that being called a homosexual in Texas is slander per se because 
of the associations with criminality that the word evokes, places an 
untenable burden on Texas’ gay citizens.284 
Justice O’Connor argued that the Equal Protection Clause makes it 
clear that people in similar situations must be treated similarly under 
the law.285  She therefore concluded: 
[T]he State cannot single out one identifiable class of citizens for 
punishment that does not apply to everyone else, with moral 
disapproval as the only asserted state interest for the law.  The Texas 
sodomy statute subjects homosexuals to ‘a lifelong penalty and 
stigma.  A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an 
underclass . . . cannot be reconciled with’ the Equal Protection 
Clause.286 
                                                          
 280. See id. at 579-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that laws that regulate 
tax or economic legislation will likely be upheld under rational basis review because 
the presumption in the Constitution is that the democratic process will fix imprudent 
decisions). 
 281. Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that her opinion in Bowers 
upholding Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute is not inconsistent with her opinion in 
Lawrence, since Georgia made it a crime if both opposite sex and same sex sodomy 
were involved, whereas Texas only made it a crime if same sex sodomy was involved). 
 282. See id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
has “never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a 
sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that 
discriminates among groups of persons”). 
 283. Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 284. See id. at 581-84 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Texas law labels 
all gays as criminals, which makes it harder for them to be treated equal to 
heterosexuals) (citing Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308, 310 (5th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 285. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (relying on the Equal Protection 
Clause to invalidate the Texas statute because it states that “all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike,” and the Texas law treats homosexuals different from 
its other citizens) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 
(1985)). 
 286. Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 
(1982) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
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Justice O’Connor was not willing, however, to make a sweeping 
statement in Lawrence about the extent to which her opinion could 
be relied upon to justify overturning laws that prohibit gays from 
being in the military or from being able to marry.287  Handing DOMA 
supporters an olive branch in the form of dicta, she said: 
Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as 
national security or preserving the traditional institution of 
marriage.  Unlike the moral disapproval of same sex relations—the 
asserted state interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote 
the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an 
excluded group.288 
Thus, when DOMA supporters are next called upon to defend their 
legislation in federal court, they will have Justice O’Connor to thank 
when the judge allows them to submit testimony about the negative 
impact gay marriages have on children with same sex parents, for 
instance.  However, since Justice O’Connor did not render an opinion 
on the merits of these kinds of arguments, gay rights advocates will 
also have her to thank when the judge allows them to submit evidence 
that refutes this kind of testimony.  Indeed, there is much evidence to 
support the latter.289 
Justice Scalia was very angry about the decision that his more 
tolerant colleagues rendered in Lawrence.290  He blamed them for 
being unduly influenced by “a law-profession culture, that has largely 
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the 
agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at 
eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to 
homosexual conduct.”291  Criticizing the majority for engaging in the 
worst kind of judicial activism, Justice Scalia said that a Court 
“impatient of democratic change” had tried to unreasonably interfere 
with the state of Texas’ legitimate right to further the wishes of its 
                                                          
 287. See id. (distinguishing this case in which no legitimate state interest could be 
proffered, from the case where law discriminates against homosexuals to further a 
state interest that is rooted in tradition). 
 288. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 289. See Ethan Jacobs, Damned Lies and Statistics—Pediatricians Debunk Right-
Wing Rhetoric About LGBT Parents, BAY WINDOWS, Oct. 27, 2005, at 11 (discussing 
peer-reviewed study of 450 children raised by a lesbian parents or couple, which 
showed that “those children were identical to their peers from heterosexual families 
in terms of self-esteem, peer relationships, gender-typical behaviors, and prevalence 
of psychiatric disorders.”)  Children in the study also seemed to be more open-
minded about diversity issues.  Id. 
 290. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refocusing the issue of 
the liberty interest involved to the right to engage in homosexual sodomy rather than 
the right of privacy of two consenting adults at home). 
 291. Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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citizens.292  “[I]t is the premise of our system that those judgments are 
to be made by the people, and not imposed by a governing caste that 
knows best[,]”293 he complained. 
In a short opinion that consists of only a few paragraphs, Justice 
Thomas called the Texas law “silly,” saying that if he had been a Texas 
legislator he would have voted against it, since the law, to his mind, 
required an unnecessary use of government resources to enforce it.294  
He said he ultimately would affirm the Texas law, however, because it 
is not the role of the Court to find that a general right of privacy 
exists.295 
Based on the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy in 
Lawrence, however, it is clear that there is a strong constitutional basis 
for the position that state and federal DOMAs are unconstitutional 
because they violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.296  The only other possible issue that could be raised to 
challenge this analysis relates to how the courts would apply the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to the question at 
hand.297 
III.  THE FULL, FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The following two scenarios illustrate how full faith and credit 
issues would play out in a gay marriage case: 
Scenario #1: Imagine that a gay male couple—Adam and Steve—
marry in Massachusetts, and decide to move to Georgia one year later.  
Just like their heterosexual counterparts, they expect that Georgia will 
recognize their marriage, complete with its accompanying rights and 
responsibilities.  For instance, if Steve becomes ill and needs to be 
hospitalized, Adam should have the right to visit Steve in the hospital, 
and make decisions about Steve’s medical treatment in the event that 
                                                          
 292. See id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision of whether to 
criminalize homosexual acts or forbid prohibition of homosexual acts is best left to 
the legislature and the democratic process). 
 293. Id. at 603-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 294. See id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (implying that even though he may 
disagree with the law, it is up to the legislature and the democratic process to correct 
imprudent decisions) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
 295. See id. at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that his duty is to “decide 
cases agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States”) (citing Griswold, 
381 U.S. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
 296. See id. at 578 (finding a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause for 
homosexuals to engage in private behavior without government intervention). 
 297. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (mandating that “Full Faith and Credit shall be 
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every 
other State”). 
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Steve becomes incapacitated.  Adam should also be able to inherit all 
of Steve’s assets should Steve die. 
Scenario #2: In the alternative, if Adam and Steve end up getting a 
divorce while still living in Massachusetts, and then move to Georgia 
separately, both should be able to expect that the terms of their 
divorce will be honored in Georgia.  Even if the two men were to 
move to Georgia and then get divorced there, they should still be 
entitled to the same rights, since: 
A married person has: the ability to get divorced in her state of 
residence, regardless of where the marriage was celebrated, and the 
right to seek property distribution under that state’s laws; the right 
to inherit even if their spouse dies intestate (without a will) or tries 
to disinherit them (in which case they still get the “spousal share”); 
and the right to sue for wrongful death if their spouses [sic] dies as 
a result of medical malpractice or other negligence.298 
Georgia, however, passed a DOMA in 2004, and most Georgia 
courts would no doubt refuse to recognize either the marital rights or 
the divorce arrangements just described.  Indeed, the federal DOMA 
supports Georgia’s right to do just that because it attempts “to ensure 
that no state would be forced under the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
against its will to recognize a same sex marriage legally contracted in a 
sister state.”299  In response, Adam (in the first scenario) or Steve (in 
the second scenario) might decide to challenge the Georgia courts in 
federal court by claiming that the Georgia courts, as well as the 
federal DOMA, violate their Full Faith and Credit rights under the 
U.S. Constitution. 
As mentioned earlier, the Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that 
each state must give full recognition to the public acts and records of 
each other state.300  The Framers of the U.S. Constitution hoped that 
the clause would be used to combat “‘the disintegrating influence of 
provincialism.’”301  Thus, since marriage is a matter of public record, 
Georgia should have to honor the rights of both men outlined in 
both scenarios.302  However, even though courts usually honor out of 
                                                          
 298. Joanna Grossman, Will Other States Recognize Vermont’s Civil Unions?, 
CNN.Com, May 20, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/05/20/findlaw. 
analysis.grossman.civilunions.txt/index.html. 
 299. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous 
Constitutional Straits: A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage Amendment and the 
Disenfranchisement of Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 606 (2005) (citing 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 2005)). 
 300. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 301. Steve Sanders, Op-Ed.,‘Full Faith’ for Judgments, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 21, 2005, at 
A27. 
 302. See, e.g., 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 63 (2005) (stating that “a marriage which 
is valid under the law of the state or country in which it is contracted will generally be 
recognized as valid”). 
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state marriages, it is a generally accepted principle of law that they are 
not required to do so in cases where the marriage in question would 
be in conflict with the state’s public policy.303  As the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled as recently as 1998, a state does not have to replace its 
statutes with the statutes of other states “dealing with a subject matter 
concerning which it is competent to legislate . . . .  A court may 
[instead] be guided by the forum State’s ‘public policy’ in 
determining the law applicable to a controversy.”304 
Sometimes state courts exercise the public policy exception and 
rule against out of state marriages that were not formed in 
compliance with their home state’s licensing criteria.305  For example, 
courts in New York and Connecticut refused to recognize out of state 
marriages in which the parties were engaging in bigamy or incest.306  
Other courts, however, decline to exercise the public policy 
exception, giving deference to the fact that applying the new home 
state’s rules to the couple in question could wreak havoc on their 
lives.  For instance, some courts in Arkansas and Indiana have 
recognized out of state marriages that did not comply with home state 
minimum age or blood relation restrictions.307  In light of the above, 
a Georgia state court could refuse to recognize Adam and Steve’s 
marriage in Scenario 1 or their subsequent divorce in Scenario 2 on 
the grounds that Georgia public policy, as articulated in Georgia’s 
DOMA, allows it to do so. 
                                                          
 303. See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Benefits, and Recognition: Current Controversies 
in the Marriage Debate, 18 B.Y.U.J. PUB. L. 569, 609-10 (2004) (noting that other 
states have typically rejected recognizing out of state marriages when there was 
bigamy or incest involved because these things were against the state’s public policy) 
(citing 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 63 (2005)). 
 304. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 552 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Milwaukee 
County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (1971) (stating that “a marriage which satisfies the 
requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be 
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which 
had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of 
the marriage.”). 
 305. See Baker, supra note 303, at 610 (delineating cases where the state will 
accept out of state marriages when the marriage involves a difference in the age of 
the parties, first cousin relationships and common law marriages from cases where a 
state will not recognize out of state marriages if the marriage involves bigamy or 
incest). 
 306. See, e.g., People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) 
(stating that “[w]hile Nigerian law and custom may permit a ‘junior wife,’ New York 
does not recognize such status); Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn. 
1961) (barring recognition of marriage in Connecticut of a uncle and niece who were 
legally married in Italy)). 
 307. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 553 (Ark. 1957) (recognizing out of 
state marriage of thirteen-year-old girl that would not be allowed under local law); 
Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing out of state 
marriage between first cousins not otherwise legal under local law). 
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When one looks at how the Supreme Court has addressed the issue 
of marriage, however, any attempt by a Georgia court to invoke the 
public policy exception can not stand.  The Loving v. Virginia case is 
illustrative of this point.308  In Loving, the two plaintiffs married in 
the District of Columbia, where interracial marriage was legal, and 
moved back to Virginia, where it was not.309  The Supreme Court 
sidestepped the issue of whether or not Virginia should grant full faith 
and credit recognition to the D.C. marriage altogether, and decided 
the case on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due 
process grounds.310  It ruled that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by 
invidious racial discriminations.”311  In a similar vein, it can be argued 
that invidious discrimination against gay people is at the heart of the 
defense of the marriage movement.  Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. 
Texas show that such discrimination is not a sufficiently legitimate 
reason to justify laws targeted to exclude gays from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protections.312  Therefore, absent a constitutional 
amendment to the contrary, even generally recognized exceptions to 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause can not be used to justify state or 
federal DOMAs that attempt to ban gay marriage. 
CONCLUSION: GAY MARRIAGE AND THE NEW SUPREME COURT 
In the fall of 2005, Chief Justice Rehnquist died at the age of eighty, 
ending his longstanding campaign to undo most of the legal gains 
made by civil rights advocates over the past fifty years, starting with the 
Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which made 
government sanctioned racial segregation illegal.313  While working as 
a clerk to Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson in the 1950s, 
                                                          
 308. See 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (finding that preservation of racial homogeneity is 
not a valid public policy). 
 309. See id. at 2-3 (stating that the couple left their residence in Virginia to be 
married in the District of Columbia, which allowed interracial marriage, and then 
returned to Virginia, hoping that the state would recognize their marriage under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
 310. See id. at 12 (finding the Virginia statute criminalizing interracial marriage to 
be unconstitutional and, thus, not reaching the issue whether Virginia would have to 
recognize an interracial marriage in the District of Columbia). 
 311. Id. 
 312. See 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a Colorado Amendment is 
unconstitutional where its only legislative goal is to make homosexuals unequal to the 
rest of its citizens); 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (decrying Texas’s purported goal of 
demeaning gays and making them unequal to other citizens as not a legitimate 
interest). 
 313. See Lane, supra note 26, at A1 (stating that Chief Justice Rehnquist waged 
“his own war of ideas against liberalism,” starting with a scathing memo about the 
decision in Brown). 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a memo characterizing as 
“pathological” claims made by civil rights groups about the prevalence 
of racism in America.314  He also wrote another memo praising the 
famous 1896 decision, Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the Court ruled 
that states should be allowed to adopt laws that sanction racial 
segregation, a decision later overturned by the Court in Brown.315  
While on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist sided against the majority 
in Grutter v. Bollinger, which upheld the right of state educational 
institutions to use race-based affirmative action programs,316 and in 
Bob Jones University, which declared that private universities 
discriminating against blacks could not obtain tax exempt status.317  
He also disagreed with the majority’s rulings in Roe v. Wade,318 which 
upheld a woman’s right to choose, Romer v. Evans,319 which 
overturned state laws excluding gays from participating in the political 
process, and Lawrence v. Texas,320 which declared state anti-sodomy 
laws unconstitutional.  It is therefore fairly clear that, had Chief Justice 
Rehnquist survived to see a gay marriage claim come before the 
Court, he would have voted against it. 
In the Summer of 2005, just a few months prior to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s passing, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor announced that 
she would retire from the Supreme Court after twenty-four years of 
service.321  Justice O’Connor, who once supported the Georgia anti-
sodomy law upheld in the Bowers decision,322 voted seventeen years 
                                                          
 314. See id. (asserting that he “take[s] a dim view of this pathological search for 
discrimination against blacks”). 
 315. See id. (noting that historians have been skeptical of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
explanation that he wrote the memo reflecting Justice Jackson’s opinion and not his 
own opinion). 
 316. See 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003) (holding that consideration of race in 
determining college admissions is constitutional as long as it is narrowly tailored and 
furthers the compelling state interest of diversity in the classroom). 
 317. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 575 (1983) (holding 
that an educational institution with discriminatory admissions policies is contrary to 
public policy and therefore cannot qualify for charitable federal tax exemptions). 
 318. See 410 U.S. 113, 176 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
plaintiff did not have standing in the case and even if there was a valid plaintiff there 
is no such privacy right that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees). 
 319. See 517 U.S. 620, 640 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (joining the 
dissenters who argued that Coloradans wanted to preserve traditional morals against a 
minority when they passed the state’s amendment and that this was the legitimate 
rational basis required to uphold the state’s amendment under Constitutional attack). 
 320. See 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Court should have followed past precedent and that there was a rational basis for the 
Texas statute). 
 321. See Thomas & Taylor, supra note 25, at 25-6 (discussing how O’Connor’s 
retirement will result in the loss of a crucial swing vote on the Supreme Court). 
 322. See 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986) (noting that Justice O’Connor joined Justice 
White’s majority opinion that the Constitution does not give homosexuals the 
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later in Lawrence to overturn Texas’ anti-sodomy statute because she 
said it unfairly targeted gay people for conduct that heterosexuals 
engaged in as well.323  Even though she reached this conclusion, and 
sometimes constituted the swing vote in other so-called liberal court 
rulings,324 the prospects for a pro-gay marriage decision endorsed by 
Justice O’Connor could hardly have been described as certain.  
Indeed, as was the case with her position on anti-sodomy laws, many 
of her decisions on other important civil rights issues like affirmative 
action have not been consistent.325  Also, as I mentioned previously, 
Justice O’Connor made it clear in her concurring opinion in 
Lawrence that she was not giving a carte blanche to each and every 
gay rights claim that might make its way to the Court.326  Claims 
brought by gays barred from serving in the military or from marrying 
each other in states that have enacted DOMAs are the two examples 
she said were not necessarily protected under the rational basis test.327  
Thus, it is not clear that Justice O’Connor would have voted in favor 
of gay marriage had she not decided to retire. 
How Rehnquist successor, Chief Justice Roberts, and O’Connor 
successor, Justice Alito, will deal with the issue of gay marriage is the 
subject of much debate.  Although Roberts was a law clerk for 
Rehnquist, it is not so easy to determine whether Roberts is cut from 
the same anti-gay cloth as his former mentor.328  On one hand, the 
new Chief Justice wrote briefs opposing abortion and advocating for 
the reversal of Roe v. Wade in his role as deputy solicitor general 
                                                          
fundamental right to engage in sodomy). 
 323. See 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing this case from 
Bowers by holding that the Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause while 
Bowers only involved analysis under substantive due process). 
 324. See Thomas & Taylor, supra note 25, at 29-30 (documenting how Justice 
O’Connor “gradually inched to the left on the great, and divisive, social issues, taking 
the court with her”). 
 325. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (endorsing the use of 
race-based affirmative action plans in educational settings), with Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995) (refusing to approve a federal 
government sponsored affirmative action plan that sought to level the playing field 
for minority businesses that racism harmed). 
 326. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the 
Texas law is unconstitutional as applied to private conducts of adults, but “that does 
not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals 
would similarly fail under rational basis review”). 
 327. See id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that the preservation of national 
security and marriage were legitimate state interests, and that statutes regulating them 
would pass rational basis review if the language was rationally related to these 
interests). 
 328. See Jeffrey Rosen, Op-Ed., In Search of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
2005, at A29 (asserting that John Roberts’ stance on stare decisis has been indecisive 
and is vague). 
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during the 1990s.329  During this time, he also advocated for 
restrictions on school busing and other policies geared at promoting 
minority civil rights. 330  On the other hand, Roberts helped gay rights 
groups prepare their arguments before the Court in the Romer case, 
when his law firm agreed to handle the case on a pro bono basis.331  
Nevertheless, Human Rights Campaign President Joe Solmonese 
warns that “Roberts has . . . urged that [Roe] . . . be overruled.  
Reversing Roe could undermine fundamental rights to privacy and 
liberty that are the legal underpinning for the freedom of gay, 
lesbian, bisexual and transgender Americans.”332  Kevin Cathcart, 
Executive Director of the gay public interest law firm, Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, says that he is still concerned about 
Roberts’ much more extensive advocacy of positions that the 
organization opposes.333 
Gay marriage proponents are also concerned about Justice Samuel 
Alito.  Like Roberts, Alito has a track record of attacking the 
constitutionality of a woman’s right to choose.  For instance, on a 
1985 application for a political appointment within the Reagan 
administration, Alito said that he was “‘particularly proud’ of his work 
on cases in which the Reagan White House had argued ‘that the 
Constitution does not protect a right to abortion.’”334  He also wrote a 
dissenting opinion in the 1991 appeals court case, Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, in which he said that “Pennsylvania has a 
legitimate interest in furthering the husband’s interest in the fate of 
the fetus.”335  The Supreme Court rejected this view, which would 
have required a woman seeking an abortion to first notify her 
husband, thus reaffirming the basic guarantees promised in Roe v. 
                                                          
 329. See id. at A29 (opining that even though Roberts signed government briefs 
advocating the overturning of Roe, he was only advocating for the position of the 
federal government, his employer). 
 330. See Maura Reynolds, Roberts Gay Rights Case Surprises Friends and Foes: 
Supreme Court Nominee Helped as Part of His Pro Bono Work, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 
2005, at A6 (asserting that some liberals consider Roberts to be much more 
conservative than he admits). 
 331. See id. (mentioning that Roberts did not bring up his participation in the 
Romer case while responding to the Senate’s inquiries). 
 332. Supreme Court Nominee, BAY WINDOWS, July 21, 2005, available at 
http://www.baywindows.com/media/paper328/news/2005/07/21/News/Supreme.
Court.Nominee-963683.shtml. 
 333. See id. (“There are a number of issues that are important in determining 
whether a nominee will respect the rights of all Americans.  Judge Roberts’ track 
record on reproductive freedom, privacy and federalism . . . merits particular 
scrutiny.”) 
 334. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David D. Kirkpatrick, Nominee Plays Down Remarks on 
Quotas and Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at A16. 
 335. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 726 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
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Wade.336 
Alito’s record on gay rights issues during his time serving on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit during the past fifteen 
years is a bit more mixed.  In a recent case most closely related to the 
gay marriage issue, he gave a very traditional reading of the meaning 
of marriage.  He ruled that the boyfriends of women forced to have 
abortions in China did not have the same right to seek asylum as did 
the husbands of women who had undergone the same hardship, 
reasoning that “marriage was a central organizing principle in the 
law,” and that to grant asylum protection “to nonspouses would create 
numerous practical difficulties.”337  In another case, Alito sided with 
the majority of the court when it concluded that a university anti-
harassment policy, which included prohibitions on the harassment of 
gays and other minorities, was an unconstitutional infringement of 
first amendment rights.338  But in another decision, he ruled that a 
New Jersey school district was obligated to fund a male student’s 
transfer to a new school because the student was being called “faggot,” 
“homo” and “gay” and harassed because he was perceived to be 
effeminate by his classmates.339  Finally, in a case that addressed the 
right of a municipality to block HIV-positive adults from taking in 
non-HIV-positive foster children, he said that the municipality’s 
“blanket policy discriminates against the Does because of (their son’s) 
HIV-positive status even though the probability of HIV transmission, 
and consequently the risk, is next to zero.”340 
Taking Alito’s record as a whole, however, Joe Solmonese said in a 
press release issued during the former circuit judge’s nomination 
hearings: “A glance at . . . [Alito’s] resume reads like an anti-gay 
textbook.  From striking down a policy that protected gay students 
from harassment to his view that would threaten Congress’ power to 
enact non-discrimination laws, he’s the wrong choice for the 
court.”341  Solmonese’s instincts about Alito may yet turn out to be 
true, since soon after Alito was sworn in for his new position on the 
                                                          
 336. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 337. Adam Liptak, In Abortion Rulings, Idea of Marriage is Pivotal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 2, 2005, at A1. 
 338. Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Gay Groups Oppose Alito Nomination, Dec. 12, 2005, 
http://www.washblade.com/thelatest/thelatest.cfm?blog_id=4008; Kathi Wolfe, 
Alito’s Record on Gay Rights a Mixed Bag, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.progressive.org/ 
media_mpwolfe010906. 
 339. See Wolfe, supra note 338. 
 340. See id. (quoting Doe v. County of Centre, 242 F.3d 437, 451 (2001)). 
 341. Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, Full Senate Can Protect Fairness with 
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Court, he sent a thank you letter to James Dobston, head of the 
conservative anti-gay marriage, anti-abortion rights group, Focus on 
the Family, saying “the prayers of so many people from around the 
country were a palpable and powerful force.  As long as I serve on the 
Supreme Court, I will keep in mind the trust that has been placed in 
me.”342  That trust will be put to the test in an abortion case the 
Supreme Court is scheduled to decide on in the Fall of 2006.  The 
case, brought by the Bush administration, challenges a lower court 
decision declaring the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 illegal, 
which makes it a crime when a doctor performs an abortion on a fetus 
that is partially outside the uterus at the time of the abortion.343  The 
Act allows such abortions to take place if the pregnant woman’s life, 
but not her health, is threatened.  Since the Court found that a 
similar restriction on a woman’s health needs rendered a Nebraska 
state law unconstitutional several years ago,344 it would appear that 
the whole question of a woman’s right to choose and the 
accompanying privacy rights previously championed by the Court will 
be called into question.  A decision that weakens these rights could 
have serious consequences for gay marriage advocates. 
Any judge on the new Supreme Court who is inclined to overturn 
Roe or rely on such a decision to deny gays the right to marry, 
however, will have to do a great deal of intellectual maneuvering to 
justify such a position.  As Justice Kennedy said in his majority opinion 
in Lawrence, the right of gays to marry derives directly from the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the judicial interpretations thereof.345  
Furthermore, given the fact that Justice O’Connor relied on Roe and 
its many equal protection and due process precursors in her 
concurring opinion in Lawrence,346 and the fact that our common 
law system expects judges to give great deference to legal precedent, 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would be hard pressed to 
ignore decades of legal jurisprudence pointing in the opposite 
                                                          
 342. Colleen Slevin, Dobson Says Alito Sent Thank-You Note for Backing His 
Nomination, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 2, 2006, available at http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=fbf0c2150b91476f9fafdc8433358218 
&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA&_md5=bbd89d162a9ebf7d4a1a6af108e3d422. 
 343. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Review Ban on Disputed Abortion Method, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A1. 
 344. Id. 
 345. See 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides protection for personal decisions about marriage, and that homosexuals in 
relationships have autonomy to make decisions about marriage just as heterosexuals 
can). 
 346. See id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (contrasting Lawrence from 
Bowers, which rested upon substantive due process and analogizing Lawrence to 
other cases in which the Court has held that statutes legislating moral animus towards 
a group are to be analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause). 
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direction.  Chief Justice Roberts himself said during his federal 
judgeship confirmation hearings that he would honor precedent.347  
And asked about his views on the subject, Alito told one Senator 
during a closed door interview that “he has tremendous respect for 
precedent . . . and that his approach is not to overturn cases due to a 
disagreement with how they were originally decided.”348  Both 
nominees’ remarks are in stark contrast to the views of Justice 
Clarence Thomas.  Known for his ultra conservative stances on issues 
pertaining to civil rights, Thomas has said that he would overturn any 
case that is inconsistent with the framers’s original intent in writing 
the Constitution.349 
Although it is difficult to predict with certainty what the ultimate 
decision will be when the Supreme Court next meets to consider a gay 
marriage claim, I believe that  if each member of the Court renders a 
decision that is in line with his or her views in the Lawrence decision, 
or in views expressed elsewhere as just discussed, the final decision 
will be that gay marriage is a fundamental right guaranteed under the 
Constitution.  That is because even if Justices Scalia, Roberts, Alito 
and Thomas all vote against such a position, there is a strong chance 
that Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens and Breyer will do 
just the opposite.  In rendering such a decision, the justices who are 
hoping to champion gay marriage might want to take their counsel 
from the federal district court judge in the May 2005 Nebraska case, 
Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning.350  The Bruning court 
appreciated the gravity of passing laws that attempt to deny equal 
rights to an entire segment of the population.  In the first ruling of its 
                                                          
 347. See Rosen, supra note 328, at A29 (commenting during his confirmation 
hearings for his appellate position that he was bound by stare decisis).  But see 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (noting that Justice Kennedy may have unwittingly opened 
the door for Justice Roberts and his more conservative colleagues to break with 
precedent and overrule Lawrence and Romer).  Justice Kennedy states: 
The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the 
judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law.  It is not, however, an 
inexorable command.  In Casey we noted that when a court is asked to 
overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional liberty interest, individual 
or societal reliance on the existence of that liberty cautions with particular 
strength against reversing course. 
Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855-56 
(1992)). 
 348. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David D. Kirkpatrick, Judge Woos Both Sides on 
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A20. 
 349. See Rosen, supra note 328, at A29 (stating that both Justice Thomas and 
Justice Scalia are Constitutional originalists and would overturn any precedent that 
strayed from the intent of the Framers of the Constitution). 
 350. See 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Neb. 2005) (holding that Section 29 of the 
Nebraska Constitution, which limited marriage to a man and woman and prohibited 
recognition of same sex marriage from other states, was unconstitutional as it was a 
“denial of equal protection”). 
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kind, Judge Batallion overturned a state of Nebraska constitutional 
amendment that limited marriage to opposite sex couples and 
prevented the state from recognizing gay marriages officiated outside 
Nebraska.351 
Judge Bataillon classified Nebraska’s law as “indistinguishable” from 
the anti-gay amendment that Colorado passed and that was 
overturned in Romer v. Evans.352  Bataillon recognized that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause did little to protect the rights of married gay 
couples who had recently moved to Nebraska.353  Despite this finding, 
the Judge decided that the amendment was illegal because there was a 
strong link between the denial of the plaintiff’s fundamental First 
Amendment rights to participate in the political process, and the 
plaintiff’s right to equal protection and to due process under the 
law.354  The Judge concluded that, “[b]ecause intrusions on First 
Amendment rights are often accompanied by invidious or irrational 
animus against a certain group, a First Amendment infringement can 
also be analyzed as the deprivation of a fundamental interest under 
the Equal Protection Clause when accompanied by proof of such 
discriminatory animus.”355  The Judge also drew the connection 
between the First Amendment right to free association and the right 
to marry.356  He reasoned that “[t]he First Amendment’s ban on 
government abridgment of speech and peaceable assembly ‘anchors 
all [of the decisions relating to a due process liberty interest] most 
firmly in the Constitution’s explicit text.’”357 
It is important to note that Judge Batallion didn’t reach his 
                                                          
 351. See id. at 987 (stating that Nebraska citizens voted for the amendment 
because of their concerns that Nebraska would have to recognize a lawful marriage 
between same sex couples from another state). 
 352. See id. at 1002 (finding the Nebraska statute indistinguishable from the 
Colorado amendment because they both try to “impose a broad disability on a single 
group,” homosexuals). 
 353. See id. at 987 n.5 (stating that according to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
states do not have to automatically recognize marriages that happened in other states 
if the marriage from the other state is against public policy) (citing Patrick J. 
Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the Same-
sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 233, 353-64 (2005)). 
 354. See id. at 990-91 (asserting that the constitutional protections that the First 
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment envision intersect “when the state interferes 
with an individual’s selection of those whom they wish to join in a common 
endeavor”). 
 355. Id. at 989 n.8. 
 356. See id. at 990 (finding similarities between the right to free association and 
the right to marry because the right to marry involves the personal choice of an 
individual desiring personal association). 
 357. Id. at 989 n.9 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1939-40 
(2004). 
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conclusions by applying either the strict scrutiny test or the rational 
basis test.  Instead, he reasoned that when the first ten amendments 
or laws that try to restrict access to the political process are involved, 
heightened scrutiny should be applied to determine their 
constitutionality.358  He explained that “[t]he court need not 
determine whether, once a law is found to be directed at a ‘politically 
unpopular group,’ more searching scrutiny is required.”359  The 
Judge therefore seems to have appropriately departed from the 
rational basis test standard of review implicitly used in Romer and 
overtly used in Lawrence, and raised the bar for those who hope to 
justify DOMAs by simply stating that there is a good reason for those 
laws, as opposed to a reason that is substantially related to an 
important government interest. 360  It could be argued that Justice 
O’Connor’s call for the use of a “more searching rational basis test” in 
Lawrence laid the groundwork for Judge Bataillon to do what he did, 
since the line between heightened scrutiny and a more searching 
rational basis standard can hardly be described as clear.361 
The Supreme Court has still not clarified whether or not the 
rational basis test should be used in all gay rights cases.362  If the 
Court were to affirm Judge Bataillon’s use of the heightened scrutiny 
test, it would be harder for states to successfully defend their DOMAs 
before it.363  Judge Bataillon therefore seems to be trying to force the 
Court’s hand and make it decide once and for all that gays deserve to 
be protected at least to the same extent as women in sex 
discrimination cases, where the heightened scrutiny test is normally 
used.364 
                                                          
 358. Id. at 1001 n.19 (requiring heightened scrutiny when legislation affects “a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution”) (citing United States v. Carolene Products, 
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 359. Id. at 1002 n.20 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
 360. See STEHPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 741 (asserting that heightened 
scrutiny falls between rational basis review and strict scrutiny and demands that the 
state show that a statute “bears a substantial relationship to an important government 
interest”). 
 361. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (prescribing that a 
higher standard of rational basis review should be used when a law is designed to 
detriment a politically unpopular segment of the population, but failing to exhibit 
what this heightened review would look like). 
 362. See Kristina Brittenham, Equal Protection Theory and the Harvey Milk High 
School: Why Anti-Subordination Alone Is Not Enough, 45 B.C.L. REV. 869, 890 
(2004) (noting that the Supreme Court has strayed from the traditional rational basis 
test but has failed to commit to an elevated standard of review). 
 363. See STEPHENS & SCHEB, supra note 158, at 741 (implying that the rational basis 
test is a “less stringent” test, thus making it easier for the government to abridge 
certain rights that others would consider fundamental). 
 364. See id. (conveying that the heightened scrutiny test is most often applied to 
claims of sex discrimination). 
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Judge Bataillon said that the government’s stated reason for the 
law—the wish to protect the traditional institution of marriage—is not 
credible, especially since the new law affects all kinds of transactions 
that have nothing to do with marriage.365  Private parties wishing to 
enter into real estate or prenuptial contracts, or business agreements 
could also be restricted from doing so by the law,366 since it bars “any 
recognition of a ‘domestic partnership,’ ‘civil union,’ or ‘same sex 
relationship.’”367  Even two people of the same sex who sign a lease in 
order to rent an apartment together might not be able to do so if the 
letter of the law was strictly enforced.368 
Judge Bataillon had it right.  State and federal DOMAs are 
unconstitutional because they infringe upon fundamental rights and 
attempt to deny equal protection and due process rights to gay 
citizens.369  DOMAs, the way they are currently written, are either so 
arbitrary in their reach or so motivated by the desire to disenfranchise 
gays that they will always fall short of the heightened scrutiny test, or 
either of the other two standards of legal review for that matter.  One 
can only hope that when the new Supreme Court eventually chooses 
to review Bataillon’s decision, or one just like it, the Court will see the 
wisdom in his analysis and follow suit. 
I am cautiously enthusiastic about a pro-gay marriage victory in the 
Supreme Court, however, for the following reasons.  By focusing 
almost exclusively on marriage—an institution that, given its 
associations with family life, and the presumed stability of certain 
kinds of mainstream monogamous relationships, is inherently 
conservative and assimilationist in nature—same sex marriage 
advocates may be unwittingly participating in a strategy that shifts the 
focus off of other, equally important social justice causes like the fight 
for economic and distributive justice, the fight to end sexism and 
racism, and the fight to protect the rights of other more politically 
expendable sexual minorities, like single and non-monogamous 
people of all sexual persuasions.  As I discussed in Part II, proposed 
legal protections favoring gay marriage therefore run the risk of 
serving to produce yet another class of economically and socially 
                                                          
 365. See Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1005 (D. 
Neb. 2005) (finding that the amendment invalidates different activities that are 
unrelated to marriage such as “a lease agreement involving two same-sex persons who 
share an apartment”). 
 366. See id. (asserting that “[s]ection 29 prohibits contracts, benefits and 
arrangements that already receive recognition in various forms in Nebraska). 
 367. Id. at 1004 (citing NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, held unconstitutional by Bruning, 
368 F. Supp. 2d 980). 
 368. See id. at 1005. 
 369. See id. (holding that Section 29 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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privileged Americans who are distanced from those who are subjected 
to these other forms of inequality.  Therefore, to paraphrase a 
traditional African-American saying, I would hope that people in the 
gay marriage movement remember to “lift up others as they climb,” by 
refusing to rest on their laurels once a positive decision is 
forthcoming, and continuing to work for a wider vision of social 
justice than the marriage movement currently embraces.  Otherwise, 
victory in the marriage wars will be bittersweet. 
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